Chapter 3

RURAL–URBAN MIGRATION IN EGYPT AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A STATISTICAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter consists of a number of diverse parts. Firstly, I will present a statistical analysis of the internal migration phenomenon in Egypt and the most recent estimates of internal migration streams and volumes, using data from the 1996 Census. Standard demographic techniques are used, including place of last and current residence calculations. A review of the existing studies on rural–urban migration in Egypt, highlighting the most significant results and insights, constitutes the second section of this chapter. The standard theories of rural–urban migration are reviewed in the third section: this review ranges widely, but inevitably cursorily in parts, over a number of conventional disciplinary and other conceptual approaches. Next, taking a preliminary cue from some aspects of the to-and-fro nature of Egyptian rural–urban migration, the fourth section looks at broader typologies of human mobility and labor circulation. Some case-studies are briefly discussed, and then the most suitable conceptual and theoretical frameworks that appear most promising for a study of rural–urban migration/mobility in Egypt are elaborated. In contrast to the previous two chapters, both short, this one is long and has a complicated structure: its overall purpose is to present a wide range of essential background statistical, literature review, and theoretical material, in order to lay the foundations for the remainder of the thesis.

3.1 Rural–urban migration in Egypt: the statistical picture

3.1.1 The old picture

The internal migration of people has a remarkable impact on population redistribution in Egypt. Although Egypt has been, traditionally speaking, an area of international
migration (migration from the eastern and the north-eastern Mediterranean countries to Egypt), it has always been an area of internal migration. In the past, foreigners were coming to Egypt, from other parts of the Arab world especially, while Egyptians rarely migrated abroad till the mid 1950s, but on the other hand Egyptians were migrating internally regularly and extensively.

As per the 1947 census data, the total number of internal migrants (based on recording prior residence) was 1.7 million. Out of this number, 1,416,000, representing 82 percent of the total number of migrants, were directed to the following four administrative regions or governorates: Cairo, Alexandria, Suez Canal, and Damitta. These are all located within the main urban part of Lower Egypt (see Figure 2.1). Migrants to these governorates numbered 1,194,000 while migrants from these governorates were only 222,000, which means that the loss represents only 18 percent of the gain. Even at that early time in Egypt’s modern migration history, then, most of the migrants headed towards Cairo.

As for the place of origin, the pattern was simple, traditional and spontaneous: people migrated from the high-density and more rural governorates. On top of all governorates we have Menoufia, which has the highest density and is also the nearest to Cairo. Menoufia exported more than one fifth of its population (22.1 percent) to the other governorates of Egypt and especially to the capital. Aswan ranked second, exporting one fifth of its population, mainly to Cairo and Alexandria. Qualyoubyya in the Delta region ranked third, followed by Assiut, Gerga (known now as Souhag) and Qena in Upper Egypt.

In the 1966 population census data, migration to Cairo increased. Out of the total number of migrants to Cairo, which was 1,181,000, migrants from the Nile valley were about 1,129,000 and the rest headed towards the border governorates. Migrants from the Delta were 683,000 or 61.9 percent, while migrants from Upper Egypt were 446,000 or 37.6 percent. Menoufiya still had the leadership in out-migration as it contributed 209,000. After Menoufia, came Assiut and Souhag from which the number of migrants was 100,000, which represents 8 percent of the migrants to Cairo. It is noticeable that Aswan lost its leadership in exporting migrants to Cairo. This is due to the High Dam
project, which was a pull factor for internal migration to Aswan.

3.1.2 The recent picture

An overview of inter-governorate (inter-province) migration for urban and rural areas by rural/urban origin or destination for the last three censuses – 1976, 1986, and 1996 – may be obtained from Table 3.1. It is important to make explicit the way migration is measured in Table 3.1 and subsequent census-based tables: migration is recorded by comparing present residence with previous residence in a different governorate, without any time limit on the inter-governorate residential move. Hence the move could have taken place one year before the census date or twenty or more years; in the latter case the same persons are likely to be recorded as being migrants across successive censuses, until they die or make another move across a governorate boundary. This is a rather specific way of measuring migration and the nature of this measurement must be borne in mind when interpreting the statistics in Table 3.1 and in successive tables.

Table 3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban/rural migration by type of movement, Egypt, 1976–1996*</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Rural–Urban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural–Rural</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</table>


*Place of current residence vs. place of previous residence
Two further background notes must be borne in mind for the following discussion. First is the way the governorates are divided into “urban” and “rural” areas. In most governorates, the “urban” consists of the governorate capital, plus the smaller “district” capital settlements, whilst the “rural” consists of villages, scattered rural settlements (satellite villages and hamlets) and Bedouin encampments (in the frontier governorates only). Frontier governorates include The New Valley, Matrouh, North and South Sinai, and Red Sea Governorates. They comprise only about one percent of Egypt’s total population. However, four governorates are entirely urban – Cairo, Alexandria, Port-Said, and Suez. The second point to note is the map of the governorates – Figure 2.1 – which shows their very uneven size and unusual configuration, dictated by Egypt’s unique geography and population distribution.

Rural to urban migration decreased as a proportion of total migration from 24.6 to 13.1 percent between 1976 and 1986, while the percentage shares in 1986 and 1996 were about the same, but the volume of movement slightly increased, in view of overall Egyptian population growth. In contrast, urban to rural migration increased from 6.5 to 10.3 percent of the total inter-governorate flows between 1976 and 1986, then to 23 percent in 1996. Urban to urban migration (inter-urban) is the largest. It fluctuated from 64.3 to 72.9 then to 60.4 percent between 1976, 1986, and 1996 respectively. Rural to rural migration was the least important type of movement, around 4 percent at each census.

Urban to urban migration is, almost certainly, greatly dominated by inter-urban migrations between the big urban governorates – Cairo, Guiza, Qualyoubyya, and Alexandria. Statistical proof of this would need disaggregation of all the inter-governorate migration data for each pair of governorates, in order to determine the fraction of “metropolitan” inter-urban migration from all other inter-urban movement. This could theoretically be done, but it would take a lot of effort. Given the widely-questioned accuracy of the census data, and the fact that my own research is on rural to urban moves (many of which are any way probably not picked up in the census because of their “hidden” nature), this piece of extra analysis was not deemed to be worthwhile.
A few other key points can be drawn out of the interesting aggregate data on Table 3.1. The first feature is the remarkable constancy of the total migration recorded in each of the three censuses – a little over 4 million. Whilst this continuity is indeed remarkable, it is partly explained by the built-in stability of the method of measuring migration whereby the same individual migrant and his/her single migration is recorded at each census as long as that individual does not make a further move across a governorate boundary. On the other hand, the disaggregation of migration types – urban to urban, rural to urban etc. – shows that these disaggregated flows are indeed changing. Hence total migration remains curiously constant, whilst the individual components of that mobility are markedly shifting. The figures speak for themselves but two noteworthy trends can be highlighted: the sharp fall of rural to urban migration between 1976 (984,000, 25 percent) and 1986 (541,000, 13 percent), and the equally sharp rise of urban to rural migration between 1986 (423,000, 10 percent) and 1996 (950,000, 23 percent). At first sight this “reverse urbanization” trend seems to negate the very rationale for doing this thesis on rural–urban migration, but the real situation is undoubtedly more complex, and probably very different, than the statistical picture. First, long-distance rural–urban migration to Cairo from Upper Egypt is a long-standing phenomenon in Egypt, traceable to the first census around a hundred years ago. Second, much of the increase in urban–rural migration between 1986 and 1996 is probably explained by return migration of retired rural–urban migrant workers back to their home villages, these rural-origin migrants having migrated to the cities in earlier decades. Third, my personal and professional demographic knowledge of the Egyptian situation leads me to strongly suspect that the bulk of rural laborers to Cairo are not officially registered by the census as rural–urban migrants because of their continuing de jure residence in rural areas. Yet another factor is the fact that a significant percent of migrants from rural to urban areas – especially to Cairo – tend to hide their rural origin and to claim that they are not migrants from rural areas. And finally some rural–urban migrants may escape census counts because of their “hidden” residence as squatters with no fixed abode.

3.1.3 Inter-governorate rural–urban migration

More details about the four types of rural–urban in- and out-migration streams are given, in relative terms, at the governorate level in Table 3.2. In this and subsequent tables in this chapter, I have highlighted the three governorates which make up the Greater Cairo,
and the seven which comprise the migrant sending areas of Upper Egypt along the Nile valley. In Table 3.2 “urban to urban” refers to in-migrants from urban areas of other governorates to urban areas of the given governorate, or out-migrants from urban areas of the given governorate to urban areas of other governorates. The same is true for “rural to rural” streams after replacing urban by rural. “Urban to rural” refers to in-migrants from urban areas of other governorates to rural areas of the given governorate or out-migrants from urban areas of the given governorate to rural areas of other governorates, and “rural to urban” refers to the reverse streams. The magnitude of the various streams in absolute numbers is given in Table 3.3. The criterion for recording migration – the simple fact of a cross-boundary change of residence at some unspecified time in the past – remains the same for Tables 3.2 and 3.3, as it was in Table 3.1. The flows recorded in these tables are simple gross migration moves. For the boundaries and location of the governorates, refer back to Figure 2.1.

From Table 3.2 it is clear that the “urban to urban” in-migration stream is the largest not only at the national level but also for the most significant streams. The proportion of “urban to urban” stream is higher than the national average in Port-Said, Cairo, Suez, Alexandria, Luxor, and Guiza. The dominant role of inter-urban flows amongst the major metropolitan centers of Greater Cairo etc. should be remembered here, as was pointed out above. The “rural to urban” stream’s proportion is above the national average in 17 governorates out of 27. The “urban to rural” flow is the second largest stream, but its size is about one third of the “urban to urban” stream. Its proportion is above the national average in 18 governorates. The highest was found in Damitta governorate while the lowest was found in North and South Sinai. The last and the smallest is the “rural to rural” in-migration stream which constitutes less than 5 percent of all in-migrants. Behera, New Valley, Kafresheikh, and Matrouh have significantly higher proportions for this type of movement.

The proportion of relative distribution of out-migrants among the four types of rural/urban migration streams indicates that the “urban to urban” stream is the largest one in all governorates with no single exception. The second largest stream is “urban to rural” with the highest percent in Guiza and Ismailia. The third largest stream is “rural to urban”. It represents 22.6 percent of all out-migrants. Its proportion
Table 3.2
Percentage distribution of inter-governorate in and out urban–rural migration streams, place of previous residence data, Egypt 1996

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<tr>
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<th></th>
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Source: Calculated for the 1996 census data (CAPMAS, 1999)
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>231,524</td>
<td>44,975</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>77,167</td>
<td>23,797</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damitta</td>
<td>5,771</td>
<td>6,542</td>
<td>40,058</td>
<td>6,512</td>
<td>65,725</td>
<td>32,606</td>
<td>8,796</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daqahlyya</td>
<td>17,687</td>
<td>25,722</td>
<td>46,102</td>
<td>4,949</td>
<td>197,213</td>
<td>60,998</td>
<td>62,088</td>
<td>30,979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharqyya</td>
<td>40,553</td>
<td>39,259</td>
<td>48,931</td>
<td>9,209</td>
<td>194,184</td>
<td>71,444</td>
<td>63,005</td>
<td>17,917</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafresheikh</td>
<td>10,835</td>
<td>14,807</td>
<td>29,274</td>
<td>9,789</td>
<td>40,935</td>
<td>27,714</td>
<td>20,215</td>
<td>5,339</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gharbia</td>
<td>28,580</td>
<td>38,722</td>
<td>46,068</td>
<td>5,323</td>
<td>136,387</td>
<td>53,459</td>
<td>49,751</td>
<td>11,080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menoufia</td>
<td>16,403</td>
<td>18,798</td>
<td>23,740</td>
<td>2,920</td>
<td>177,208</td>
<td>31,052</td>
<td>61,010</td>
<td>14,707</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behera</td>
<td>18,697</td>
<td>11,098</td>
<td>92,621</td>
<td>26,423</td>
<td>85,039</td>
<td>57,500</td>
<td>30,850</td>
<td>7,980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismailia</td>
<td>122,662</td>
<td>15,810</td>
<td>70,470</td>
<td>25,065</td>
<td>24,205</td>
<td>16,144</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td>853</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port-Said</td>
<td>190,639</td>
<td>18,603</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>17,585</td>
<td>3,238</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>166,139</td>
<td>24,749</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>27,494</td>
<td>4,111</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayoum</td>
<td>6,041</td>
<td>6,172</td>
<td>9,763</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>72,114</td>
<td>16,189</td>
<td>14,786</td>
<td>3,559</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni-Suif</td>
<td>9,143</td>
<td>7,688</td>
<td>13,797</td>
<td>3,018</td>
<td>67,246</td>
<td>14,930</td>
<td>15,106</td>
<td>2,866</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menia</td>
<td>9,617</td>
<td>17,193</td>
<td>25,520</td>
<td>3,453</td>
<td>80,946</td>
<td>26,631</td>
<td>32,059</td>
<td>3,938</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assiut</td>
<td>12,868</td>
<td>15,998</td>
<td>12,276</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>138,289</td>
<td>27,857</td>
<td>43,229</td>
<td>10,369</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souhag</td>
<td>10,694</td>
<td>14,641</td>
<td>21,673</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>178,304</td>
<td>34,327</td>
<td>57,159</td>
<td>13,504</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qena</td>
<td>6,876</td>
<td>4,505</td>
<td>12,344</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>100,566</td>
<td>19,115</td>
<td>39,582</td>
<td>8,731</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aswan</td>
<td>28,944</td>
<td>12,118</td>
<td>13,358</td>
<td>3,749</td>
<td>45,151</td>
<td>10,631</td>
<td>6,429</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxor</td>
<td>2,895</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>16,101</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>575</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>20,337</td>
<td>12,576</td>
<td>4,881</td>
<td>2,306</td>
<td>3,849</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Valley</td>
<td>6,742</td>
<td>5,629</td>
<td>3,942</td>
<td>3,306</td>
<td>6,266</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>4,254</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrouh</td>
<td>14,592</td>
<td>2,709</td>
<td>8,835</td>
<td>4,371</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Sinai</td>
<td>21,370</td>
<td>8,787</td>
<td>3,501</td>
<td>2,918</td>
<td>3,353</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>855</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Sinai</td>
<td>8,562</td>
<td>4,383</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Egypt</strong></td>
<td>2,535,864</td>
<td>562,471</td>
<td>949,489</td>
<td>147,611</td>
<td>2,535,864</td>
<td>949,489</td>
<td>562,471</td>
<td>147,611</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Calculated for the 1996 census data (CAPMAS, 1999)

NA = Not applicable (Cairo, Alexandria, Port-Said, and Suez have no rural areas)
is higher for New Valley, Qena, and Menia, while significantly lower for Luxor, Ismailia, and Red Sea governorates. The last stream, “rural to rural”, includes 3.5 percent of out-migration only.

3.1.4 Governorate migration indices

When the streams are grouped by type of destination for in-migrants and by type of origin for out-migrants, one may throw some light on in- and out-migration for urban and rural areas. Instead, it is more informative and convenient to study in-, out- and additionally net-migration for urban and rural areas from the available data as presented in Table 3.4.

The first striking fact revealed by Table 3.4 is that urban areas are net losers in the majority of non-urban governorates of Lower and Upper Egypt. Thus, the 387,018 net loss is the net balance of considerable net gains in some of these areas and net losses in others. The major net gains in non-urban governorates are those of urban areas in Guiza and Qualyoubyya, mainly those within the Greater Cairo Region. In the meantime, the 387,018 net gain to rural areas represents the balance of net gains of 648,956 in these areas in a number of governorates and 261,938 net losses in the remaining areas.

Again, the major net gains in non-urban governorates are those of rural areas in Guiza and Qualyoubyya, mainly those within the GCR. Migration from rural Egypt to rural areas in these two governorates comprises 60 percent of the net gain to rural areas (388,641 out of 648,956). I may assume, with a high degree of confidence, that this is an implicit rural to urban migration. This may be attributed, in part, to the housing problem in Cairo, so that migrants tend to prefer to live in the peri-urban villages, slum areas, and suburban districts where housing is less expensive than in the old and planned areas in Greater Cairo. This trend is confirmed by mappings of Cairo’s census districts (kisms) in Sutton and Fahmi (2001), which show consistent decline, sometimes over several censuses, in center-city kisms, and rapid growth in outer districts. These peripheral areas are considered in the census as rural areas. It is important here to refer to the definition of rural areas in Egypt, which mainly depends on administrative definition of urban and rural areas, rather than their “objective” rural or urban character,
### Table 3.4
Migration streams by governorates and urban–rural categories, Egypt 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Urban Volume</th>
<th>Rural Volume</th>
<th>Indices (per 1000 population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>Net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>805,196</td>
<td>859,652</td>
<td>-54,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiza</td>
<td>621,505</td>
<td>196,939</td>
<td>424,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalyoubiya</td>
<td>291,682</td>
<td>128,094</td>
<td>163,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>276,499</td>
<td>100,964</td>
<td>175,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damietta</td>
<td>12,313</td>
<td>98,331</td>
<td>-86,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daqahliya</td>
<td>43,409</td>
<td>258,211</td>
<td>-214,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharqyya</td>
<td>79,812</td>
<td>265,628</td>
<td>-185,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafreshikh</td>
<td>25,642</td>
<td>68,649</td>
<td>-43,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gharbia</td>
<td>67,302</td>
<td>189,846</td>
<td>-122,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menoufiya</td>
<td>35,201</td>
<td>208,260</td>
<td>-173,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behera</td>
<td>29,795</td>
<td>142,539</td>
<td>-112,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismailia</td>
<td>138,472</td>
<td>40,349</td>
<td>98,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port-Said</td>
<td>209,242</td>
<td>20,823</td>
<td>188,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>190,888</td>
<td>31,605</td>
<td>159,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayoum</td>
<td>12,213</td>
<td>88,303</td>
<td>-76,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni-Suíf</td>
<td>16,831</td>
<td>82,176</td>
<td>-65,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menia</td>
<td>26,810</td>
<td>107,577</td>
<td>-80,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assiut</td>
<td>28,866</td>
<td>166,146</td>
<td>-137,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qena</td>
<td>11,381</td>
<td>119,681</td>
<td>-108,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aswan</td>
<td>41,062</td>
<td>55,782</td>
<td>-14,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loxor</td>
<td>3,192</td>
<td>18,885</td>
<td>-15,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>32,913</td>
<td>5,310</td>
<td>27,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Valley</td>
<td>12,371</td>
<td>8,002</td>
<td>4,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrouh</td>
<td>17,301</td>
<td>3,844</td>
<td>13,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Sinai</td>
<td>30,157</td>
<td>6,084</td>
<td>24,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Sinai</td>
<td>12,745</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>11,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Egypt</td>
<td>3,098,33</td>
<td>3,485,355</td>
<td>-387,018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated for the 1996 census data (CAPMAS, 1999)
which may of course change over time. Also, due to the tendency to limit public expenditure and to protect agricultural land, the government of Egypt tends to keep the rural/urban split as it is.

### 3.2 Studying rural–urban migration in Egypt: a limited literature

It is remarkable that the “international” literature on internal migration in less-developed countries pays so little attention to Egypt, or to the Middle East in general. Studies on Latin America, tropical Africa and Asia thoroughly dominate this literature. Let me take some examples from the library shelves of well-known texts to make this point. Kosinski and Prothero’s (1975) edited volume *People on the Move* contains 23 chapters and 400 pages, with studies on internal migration from all parts of the world except North Africa and the Middle East. Brown and Neuberger (1977) is another edited volume which purports to be “a comparative perspective on internal migration”. It has 24 chapters, more than 500 pages, but again nothing on Egypt or any Middle Eastern country. Richmond and Kubat (1976) is yet another edited book which compares internal migration in various countries around the world: 13 chapters, 320 pages, nothing on Egypt or the Middle East – the nearest is a chapter on urbanization and migration in Addis Ababa (Palen, 1976). Jorge Balan’s *Why People Move: Comparative Perspectives on the Dynamics of Internal Migration* (1981) likewise skirts the Middle East, with just one contribution out of its 16 chapters on rural migration and agrarian change in Turkey. Another very well-known text is Prothero and Chapman’s *Circulation in Third World Countries* (1985) which contains 20 chapters, nearly 500 pages, and again nothing on rural–urban movement in the Middle East. Likewise Skeldon’s (1990) detailed analytical overview of internal migration in developing countries contains no single reference to Egypt nor any North African or Middle Eastern country, drawing most of the empirical material from Peru, Papua New Guinea, India, China and Japan. Finally, even texts about mobility in Africa tend to assume “Africa” means sub-Saharan or “Tropical” Africa (see for instance van Binsbergen and Meilink, 1978). Where studies do focus explicitly on the Arab and Middle Eastern area (see Shami, 1993, 1994), the focus is on forced displacement and resettlement rather than on “natural” migration; or, as in the case of two fairly recent papers by Boukhemis and Zeghiche (1988, 1990) on the Algerian city.
of Constantine, the analysis is limited to rather straightforward presentations of census data.

Yet the importance of internal migration in Egypt is clear from the statistical review undertaken in the earlier part of this chapter. We saw that internal migration is responsible for the redistribution of nearly 25 percent of Egypt’s population, and for the rapid growth of Egyptian cities – especially Cairo and Alexandria. A review of the existing studies on rural–urban migration in Egypt, highlighting the most significant insights, is now presented in this section. The plan of this review is first to describe the regional flows and then to look at certain key migration topics, such as the characteristics of internal migrants, the decision-making processes bearing on migration, the modes of adjustment followed by migrants, and the general macro-scale causes of internal migration as presented in the Egyptian literature. My account updates and depends heavily on an earlier study by Ibrahim (1982), where he reviewed some dozens of studies related to internal migration in Egypt, most of them, however, of small-scale significance and published in Arabic.

### 3.2.1 Trends and directions of internal migration

Internal migration in Egypt has generally been: a) from South to North; b) from South and North to the Canal Zone; c) from all of Egypt’s hinterland to Cairo and Alexandria; and, d) from Egypt’s center to its peripheries. As numerous studies have shown, the biggest convergence of migration streams culminates in the Greater Cairo Region which includes Cairo, Guiza, and Qualyoubyya governorates (Adams, 1986; Aldakhil, 1999; Burden, 1973; El-Boraey, 1984, 1986; El-Kurdy, 1974; Ibrahim, 1986; Nassef, 1985; Sharaa, 1964; Sharnouby, 1968; Shoieb et al., 1994).

#### a) Migration from South to North

By South in the present context, we are referring to the governorates of Middle and Upper Egypt, i.e., south of the Greater Cairo Region. Hence South includes Fayoum, Menia, Beni-Sueif, Assiut, Souhag, Qena, Luxor, and Aswan. These governorates represent a relatively narrow strip of green land on both sides of the Nile. As a function of limited opportunities for either vertical or horizontal agricultural expansion (i.e.
intensification of the already highly intensive agricultural regime or expansion of cultivation to new areas), mounting population pressure has been markedly felt for the last hundred years. One response to this pressure has been a steady stream of out-migration to the north.

Souhag, Qena, Aswan, and Assiut have been the major suppliers of out-migrants to the North – to Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal governorates. Hassan (1969) estimated the net loss from the South to the North at about one million over the first six decades of this century. Of course, this figure is very much lower than the volume of internal migration recorded in recent decades, but it must be remembered that the total Egyptian population was itself much lower in the past – in 1947 for instance it was only 19 million. El-Badry (1965), after elaborate calculations, contends that the four southernmost governorates exported a net 13.0 percent of their combined population to other regions in Egypt during these same decades. In the last four decades, 1960s to the 1990s, the same trends continued but with some noted variations. Aswan, for example, is now more of a population exchanger, having seen a marked decline in its net loss.

b) The Suez Canal Zone

Until the 1947 census, this area was administratively divided into two governorates: the Canal (which comprised the two cities of Port-Said and Ismailia) and Suez. By the following census (1960) the Canal was sub-divided into two separate governorates known at present as Port Said Governorate and Ismailia Governorate – with the latter incorporating substantial rural areas. The inflow of migrants to the three governorates began immediately with the opening of the Suez Canal in the 1860s. The two neighboring governorates of Daquhlyya and Damitta accounted for most of the supply to Port-Said. Sharqyya provided most of the inflow to Ismailia. Qena, in the deep South, contributed the largest share of the net migration gain of Suez.

After the 1967 Arab–Israeli war, the three cities of Port-Said, Suez, and Ismailia were evacuated; over 60 percent of their respective populations became “forced temporary migrants” to other parts of the country. But starting in 1974 after the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, most of them returned.
c) Migration from the hinterland to Cairo and Alexandria

The two largest Egyptian cities have been the greatest magnets of migration streams. Beside their net population imports from the South, noted above, the two cities attracted similar streams from the Delta. We look briefly at each city.

About two thirds of the scholarly studies on Egyptian migration have concentrated on the capital city of Cairo. Over the long term, Cairo’s net gain from the South averages about 40 percent of its total in-migrants. The Delta governorates contributed the balance of 60 percent during the twentieth century. Most of this hinterland contribution to Cairo’s population has come from Menoufia, Daquhlyya, and Gharbia (Abdel-Hakim, 1966, 1968, 1974 and 1975; Aldakhil, 1999; Nassef, 1985). Cairo has long been a net population importer, with the biggest suppliers being Menoufia, Souhag, Assiut, Gharbia, Daquhlyya, Qualyoubyya and Qena. Only in very recent years does the momentum of (recorded) population arrival seem to be slackening.

Unlike Cairo, Alexandria has not been focused on as frequently by students of Egyptian migration – although it is the second largest city in the country and it displays many of the same demographic dynamics. Alexandria has been a net migration gainer since the turn of the century, although at a rate smaller than Cairo. Like Cairo, the city of Alexandria received most of its migrants from Menoufia in the Delta, and from Souhag, Qena, and Aswan in the deep South. But there are additional major supplies from the Delta – notably Behera, Gharbia, and Kafresheikh.

d) The Frontier governorates

A minor stream of migration has operated from the center to the Red Sea and Sinai areas from the late 1930s on. (Naturally, the flow to Sinai was interrupted during the years of Israeli occupation – 1967–84). Although very small in absolute volume, it looms large in relative terms vis-à-vis the low total population of these areas. The main suppliers of the in-migrants to the frontier areas were Qena, Souhag, and Cairo itself. The expansion of the Red Sea and south Sinai coastal resorts will probably stimulate further migration to these developing coasts – as long as the tourism industry remains buoyant, which it hardly is at present.
3.2.2 One-step versus multi-step migration

The Western experience of rural–urban migration was to a great extent one of a multi-step process. Unfortunately, Egyptian census data do not enable us to answer this question with respect to this country. There are, however, a few old small sample surveys that shed light on this point (Hegazy, 1971; Ouda, 1964; Saad, 1976). The available evidence reveals that the overwhelming majority of migrants to Cairo, for example, have come to it directly from their communities of origin – bypassing small and middle-size towns. In one sample survey one-step migrants accounted for 78 percent of the total (Saad, 1976). Another sample survey indicated that only 13 percent of the migrants had engaged in more than one move between the point of origin and the point of destination, the rest (87 percent) having engaged in one-step migration (El-Kurdy, 1974). The nature of the spatial distribution of population, transport, and settlement structures in Egypt, plus the long establishment of rural–urban migration flows, probably accounts for the lack of a stepwise migratory process in Egypt.

3.2.3 Characteristics of internal migrants

Studies of Egypt’s internal migrants have in various ways helped to portray their characteristics. Most have concentrated on their age and sex composition from a statistical point of view; a few tried to describe their occupational, educational and socio-economic profiles. The overall conclusions in these respects are: the very strong dominance of males over females; the dominance of young over old age groupings; and the lack of a markedly explicit “selection process” as regards migrants’ socio-economic characteristics. As to the latter point, however, studies tend to show that the migrants are of relatively higher educational and occupational background than their average counterparts at the point of origin, but lower than the counterparts at the point of destination (Attiya, 1976; CAPMAS, 1989). We shall find out later on whether the rural–urban migrants to Cairo studied in my own survey match these profile characteristics.
One of the strongest factors in Egyptian internal migration is the search for better work opportunities than those existing (if indeed there are any) at points of origin. Despite the prominence of this factor, only a few studies of Egyptian migration reviewed in this section have focused specifically on it. One such is the study that was carried out by Toth (1999), which I briefly mentioned earlier. Toth conducted anthropological research in Kafresheikh governorate in the lower Delta region to study migrant farm workers; his fieldwork took place in 1980–82. Toth described a composite migrant labor process out to work sites on the perimeter of Egypt’s northern Delta region. He examined why poor village farm laborers migrate to work in non-agricultural activities. Seasonal unemployment and the region’s underdevelopment were the two main reasons that were mentioned by Toth, but his analysis also incorporated a powerful political economy perspective which linked rural migrant workers to state control of labor resources in the context of public infrastructural and development projects during the 1960s and 1970s.

3.2.4 The migration decision-making process

Few studies among those reviewed in this section have focused on the decision-making process of migration. Reviewing this limited literature, I would say that communication, inducement and facilitators seem to be three key variables which make the difference in the decision to migrate among all those rural Egyptians who otherwise would appear to have similar socio-economic and psychological profiles. Let us take each of these three elements in turn. Two rather dated empirical studies (Ouda, 1974; Saad, 1976) revealed that actual migrants had first- or second-hand knowledge about the chosen destination while still at the point of origin. Pre-migration visits to the former were common, so the destination was not entirely strange to them. Those who had made prior visits to the target destination had learned about it from friends, relatives, or the mass media. Serving in the army was also a way of getting acquainted with several urban areas. The inducers of migration were either direct persuasion from relatives and friends, or indirect through emulation of others from the home community. The facilitator variable refers to actual or expected help upon migrating to the new community, where kin, friends and co-villagers facilitate their arrival and settlement – housing, work, and so on. This aspect is dealt with in the next subsection.
3.2.5 Modes of migrants' adjustment

Most of the studies bearing on migrant adjustment in Egypt have been pioneered or inspired by the work of Janet Abu-Lughod (1961, 1969). Some researchers have dealt with rural migrant adjustment in urban areas in general (Hegazy, 1971; Ouda, 1974). Others have focused on the adjustment of a particular type of migrant. The common features of the adjustment pattern among migrants are seeking help from blood-kin or folk-kin in the new community. The help takes the form of finding residence, employment, and smoothing the acquaintance with the new community. The new migrants often reside with or close by older migrants from their original community. This tends to create concentrated pockets of migrants from closely-related backgrounds in an otherwise impersonal urban world. These clusters also assist in finding employment nearby and/or in places where relatives, friends, and people of similar provincial background are employed (Guhl and Abdel-Fattah, 1991). Again, my own study will provide further evidence for this.

3.2.6 Causes of internal migration

Many of the studies on Egypt’s internal migration have pointed to several factors causing or facilitating this migration. Consistently they all mention the following causes as push factors.

a) Mounting demographic pressure
This factor is often inferred from the rising density resulting from rapid population growth in the twentieth century (Abdel-Hakim, 1966, 1975; Ismail, 1990; Nassef, 1985; Sharnouby, 1967, 1968). Demographic pressure, as reflected in high population density, is not of itself an intrinsic cause of migration; it only becomes a causal factor when mediated through a relationship with economic or livelihood resources such as employment, income, land etc. In Egypt high population density is assumed to be in relation to cultivable land in the areas of origin. As the pressure increases, a population increment which cannot live off the land has to go somewhere; migration thus acts as a “safety-valve”.

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b) Declining economic opportunities

This is singled out and elaborated in the case of rural areas in terms of a) the increasing number of landless families; b) the increasing fragmentation of land-holdings because of inheritance, thus making it progressively more difficult to support one’s family from ever-diminishing land; and c) the low level of wages for those who may find permanent or intermittent local employment (Abdel-Rahim, 1971; CAPMAS, 1973; Fadil, 1978; INP-ILO, 1968; Magdoub, 1972; Toth, 1999).

Adams (1986) confirmed what is well-known in Egypt – that internal migration from rural to urban areas in Egypt is one of the strategies that the rural poor use to survive. During the winter months (December to March), when there is limited demand for agricultural laborers anywhere, poor peasants were found to temporarily migrate to Cairo in search of unskilled work. With the recent boom in the construction industry in Cairo, many of these poor peasants have been able to find temporary employment as brick-carriers, cement-mixers, general laborers, and porters. Almost anyone who lives in Cairo is aware of this movement; what my own survey will do is to add precise knowledge and interpretations to this established but little-researched phenomenon of “survival migration”.

A more recent study by Aldakhil (1999) suggested that low income levels in Egyptian rural governorates tend to encourage people to move toward high-income governorates; theoretically this should mean that inter-governorate wage differentials in rural areas have been narrowed by migration, although statistical evidence to verify this hardly exists. The unemployment rate variable was found by Aldakhil to be a major determinant of the individual’s decision to migrate in Egypt. Although the official estimate of rural unemployment (by the Ministry of Manpower) is 11 percent, this figure probably hides a great deal of underemployment and disguised inactivity. Higher rates of unemployment at origin undoubtedly tend to encourage migration from rural and urban areas. Migration to urban areas is more responsive to unemployment than migration to rural areas. The response of each migration flow to population at the origin is inelastic and migrants are more attracted to urban areas and to governorates that have large populations which generate extra employment openings than those in rural areas. The study by Aldakhil suggested carrying out micro-level research to include smaller places in order to account
for some variable biases. My own study responds to this suggestion.

c) **Scarcity of services and other social amenities**

Here several authors have collected data to show the relative deprivation in some areas of Egypt with regard to educational and health services (e.g., purified water, electricity, culture, recreation, etc.). The greatest differentials are obviously between rural and urban Egypt. But it is also noted that even among urban centers, Cairo and Alexandria have a disproportionate share at the expense of provincial capitals and smaller towns (Abdel-Hakim, 1975; CAPMAS, 1989, 1999; El-Kurdy, 1974; Fadil, 1978; Ibrahim, 1977;).

If the push factors underline the decision to leave the community of origin, it is the pull factors which determine where to go. Most studies of Egyptian migration have highlighted one aspect or another of the tremendous concentration of production, employment opportunities, services, wealth, and political power in Egypt’s major urban areas, especially Cairo and Alexandria. This concentration has made them unrivaled magnets of the country’s internal migrants from both rural and other smaller urban areas (CAPMAS, 1973; El-Kurdy, 1974; Farag, 1970; Hegazy, 1971; Hussein, 1988; INP-ILO, 1968; Saad 1976).

**3.2.7 General characterization of the literature on Egypt’s migration**

The frequency of writing on a given topic broadly reflects the degree of awareness and concern among scholars and policy-makers. The writings on Egypt’s internal migration before 1960 were very few. The greatest concentration of studies dealing with the topic was started in the 1960s. The Egyptian censuses have been the main source of data for most of the literature reviewed. Few works have relied on other sources of data, such as questionnaire or interview surveys, or qualitative/ethnographic field research. The types of variables used in the existing studies of Egypt’s internal migration were therefore determined by their respective source of data. Those relying solely on the census used strictly demographic–geographic variables – such as age, sex, mortality, fertility, and administrative residence. The sample surveys used a broader range of socio-economic variables in addition to the demographic–geographic ones; but most sample studies have been too small in scale to be regarded as definitive or rigorous.
Most of the published work on Egyptian migration in the last two decades has been fairly strictly quantitative, analyzing migration from a statistical and demographic perspective. A kind of “closed cycle” can be observed by which only statisticians and demographers have carried out this research, using the statistics provided by censuses and other official sources. Such studies, like nearly all the literature reviewed in this section, seem to have made very little use of the vast international theoretical literature on migration. The scarcity of theoretical orientation leaves the field of Egypt’s internal migration dominated by descriptive statistical studies. The scarcity of theory utilization has undoubtedly affected the overall quality of the existing research on Egypt’s internal migration. The pattern has been for one author to make an original contribution of fairly high quality and then for about ten others to repeat, duplicate, or follow suit adopting an approach which is neither critical nor with much additional revelation. My own task is now to respond to this theoretical deficit by surveying some of the key conceptual literature in migration studies, notably that which relates to internal migration within a developing world context, and integrate what is relevant in this theoretical literature to my own empirical investigation. I take up this challenge in the remainder of this chapter, starting at section 3.3. As a bridge to this theoretical and conceptual literature, the next subsection (3.2.8) sets out a threefold typology of migrations from Upper Egypt to Cairo.

### 3.2.8 Typology of Upper Egyptian movements to Cairo

As we saw from the earlier historical account, Upper-to-Lower Egyptian migration is a long-standing phenomenon, statistically traceable to the first population census in 1897, but probably in existence before that date too. One can distinguish two main phases of this long-distance migration: pre-modernization and post-modernization. The Egyptian revolution led by Nasser (1952) and the independence from British colonization (1956) make the boundary between the two migration eras.

The pre-modernization phase was characterized by a low but consistent migration stream from Upper Egypt to Cairo, in which migrants were mainly motivated by the search for better health services, education for their children, and other amenities, which were all
lacking in Upper Egypt. Migrants of this type and time established typical migration selectivity rules: they tended to be more open-minded and ambitious, and with better education (and, therefore, aspirations for more education), than the norm for the Upper Egyptian population. Most of these migrants settled permanently with their families in Cairo, keeping, at least initially, strong contacts with their extended families in Upper Egypt. With successive generations, however, these contacts became less strong until they reached a minimal, symbolic level – perhaps by burying their dead in the village.

Not all the migrants to Cairo before the 1950s were of the above type. Other, poorer segments of Upper Egyptian population were also migrating at that time. Whilst the Cairo construction sector was not big enough to absorb many migrant workers, most of the servants, private drivers, and porters in Cairo did originate from Upper Egypt – especially from Aswan governorate. Before the building of the Aswan Dam in the 1960s, many peasants in Upper Egypt used to work in agriculture seasonally and “circulate” for the rest of the year under what was known as the “taraheel” system (for more details on this see Toth, 1999). Rural-based subcontractors, who had prior contacts with the main contractors involved in public works and civil engineering schemes, were specialized in hiring unskilled rural laborers (usually in village groups of about 20-50 workers) to work on projects such as paving roads and cleaning and digging new canals in Lower Egypt. This system started with the building of the Suez Canal in the 1860s. Labor circulation and taraheel work afforded a minimum level of living for the poorer peasant families of Upper Egypt, and can be seen as a kind of historical antecedent of the less organized and more informal contemporary circuits of labor migration that I am studying in this thesis.

The post-modernization era saw a profound change in the social and economic geography of Egypt. Nasser’s “industrial revolution” moved Egypt from an agricultural society to a partially modern industrial society; heavy industrial zones were established, mainly in and around the capital, notably at Helwan in the southern part of Cairo and Subra-el-Kheima in the northern part of the city. Tens of thousands of unskilled laborers migrated from all parts of Egypt to work in the new factories, enjoying both a secure job and a housing unit. This period – the late 1950s and the early 1960s – can be called the “golden age of migration” in Egypt. However, some of those who moved during this
golden age – the less qualified – failed to get access to the public sector industrial jobs; they settled in Cairo doing unskilled work in services and general laboring.

By 1975, when Anwar Sadat announced an open-door economic policy (Nasser had restricted international migration as part of his socialist revolution), massive numbers of Egyptians migrated on a temporary basis to the Arab Gulf countries. In the early 1980s another major emigration took place to Iraq to replace the local workers who were engaged in the Iran-Iraq War. By this time, the building boom had started in Cairo, fueled by two factors: remittances from Egyptian workers in the Gulf; and the construction of satellite towns surrounding Cairo, such as the “6th of October” and the “10th of Ramadan” settlements. This construction boom stimulated a large and constant, yet unorganized, stream of unskilled laborers, mainly from Upper Egypt, who migrated on a circular basis, replacing the old taraheel system. This migration stream has been sustained and reinforced by many factors – land fragmentation and agricultural rent increases, overpopulation of rural areas, the return of hundreds of thousands of Egyptian workers from Iraq and Jordan after the Second Gulf War, and the size and centralization of economic activities in Cairo, as well as the dynamism of the informal sector and its ability to absorb very large numbers of rural laborers.

Concluding this survey, Upper Egyptians in Cairo today can be classified into three main groups according to their migration history and the type of their movement:

- “Old migrants”, and their descendants, who are totally integrated into Cairo’s social and economic life. With the passing of time these migrants, who were a kind of “upper class” of rural migrants who migrated for educational and related reasons, have tended to fade in numbers, since better education, including more than ten new universities in different regions of Egypt, and improved health services have become widespread in Upper Egypt.

- “Established migrants” who have kept their Upper Egyptian identities. Such migrants arrived in Cairo mainly in the early Nasser era as “left-overs” from the industrial migration system, staying on to do very low-status jobs in the informal
urban economy. They settled in, and developed the expansion of, poor, degraded areas of the city, including occupying the city’s cemeteries. These unplanned, often peripheral districts have kept links to the village and district origins, with the result that these migrants have not managed to fully integrate into Cairo’s social fabric. Some of their settlements, including the cemetery, are regarded as “risky” areas for outsiders to wander around. These migrants are less educated and less privileged than the first group. Given their time of arrival, since the late 1950s, they are now into their third generation.

- “Circular” migrants who spend most of their working lives in Cairo but retain family and socio-cultural bases in their home villages in Upper Egypt. Basically, these to-and-fro migrants represent the rural poor and have replaced those who in earlier decades moved as taraheel workers. This is the group my research mainly focuses on.

I shall comment later on in my thesis about the (lack of) social contacts between these migrant groups, but it can be noted briefly here that some inter-group social links are minimal, surprisingly so given the overlapping of origins in Upper Egypt. For instance, relationships between the “old” and the “established” migrants (the first and the second groups above) are always maintained for one generation (the “first” generation who initiated the migration process to Cairo), but are then weakened by the full integration of the second generation of the first group into Cairo social life, together with the socio-economic and cultural “gap” between these two groups – the first of markedly higher status than the second. The relationship between the first and the third groups is almost nil, given their separation in class and in time. As for the social links between the second and the third groups, again there is a temporal disjuncture which to some extent “disconnects” the people involved in each group. Nevertheless, as we shall see, some contacts are maintained, mainly for those “circular” migrants who originate from villages which have, at an earlier stage, set up “established” communities of their permanent migrants in geographically-defined areas of Cairo.
3.3 Theories of rural–urban migration: a review

For some decades, various disciplinary and multi-disciplinary approaches have been trying to analyze and provide fundamental understanding for the phenomenon of migration. There are multitudes of theoretical as well as empirical studies, which are concerned with the determinants both of international and of internal migration. In this next important section of the chapter I present a review and critical evaluation of the main existing theories of migration, with special reference to rural–urban movement in those developing countries with some similarities to Egypt. I deal first, and briefly, with four main discipline-based approaches to the study of internal migration; then, more importantly, I review and evaluate the more consolidated theoretical approaches, most of which have their roots in economic or behavioral principles. It will eventually be seen that “conventional” theories of rural–urban migration as a discrete, “closed” process are not fully adequate to “explain” much rural-urban movement in Egypt and elsewhere: hence in the subsequent section, 3.4, I open up another avenue of conceptual enquiry into “circular” migration.

3.3.1 Disciplinary approaches

A variety of disciplinary approaches exist purporting to explain how migrant decisions are made (Oberai and Bilsborrow, 1984). I will briefly present the cases of sociology, economics, geography, and anthropology, in that order. In each case, I will summarize and evaluate the contribution of each discipline to the study of rural–urban migration in contexts like the Egyptian case.

a) Sociology

Although economists and geographers might contest the claim, it can be argued that the study of migration has traditionally been more the domain of sociology than of any other discipline. The reason for that is clear: migrants are social beings, migration is a social process, with effects on both the societies of origin and destination, and of course on the migrants themselves (Jackson, 1986; Jansen 1969). Since the early days of the Chicago School, sociological analysis has also examined the social class aspects of migration, the
notion of “competition” between immigrant groups, and the impact of migration on social and urban structures. Sociologists have considered a wide range of factors influencing individual and household migration decisions, including demographic factors such as age, sex, education, race, household size and composition; geographical factors such as distance; social-psychological factors such as desires for so-called amenities; economic factors such as income and occupation; and attitudinal factors such as aspirations for improving one’s economic status and income, being close to friends and relatives, and so on. Virtually all of these decision-making factors have relevance to a study of Egyptian internal migration.

While the field of sociology has clear ties with geography in its recognition of the importance of distance, and with economics in its recognition of the primacy of economic factors in determining migration movements, its very eclecticism has confounded attempts to develop a coherent theory of migration. Sociology’s primary concerns with the sociology of immigrant assimilation (e.g. Schmitter Heisler, 2000), or more recently with globalization and migration (Cohen, 2000; Urry, 2000), have veered the discipline away from a close engagement nowadays with rural–urban migration. Nevertheless the social aspects of my study of Egyptian rural–urban migration will be a fundamental part of my analysis. This analysis will not necessarily engage heavily with sociological theory, but will pay close attention to the social origins of migrants, their roles in the societies of both Cairo and their villages, their social networks, aspirations and so on.

b) Economics

Economists have naturally concentrated on economic factors influencing migration. The focus in neo-classical models has traditionally been on aggregate factors, especially wage, income, and unemployment levels. It has had a clear policy orientation (implicit if not explicit) from the beginning (i.e. how can migration be integrated into economic planning), which in retrospect appears often to have been unrealistically exaggerated because of the exclusion of non-economic variables and the failure to analyze how migration decisions are usually made. More recently, economists have begun to focus on factors influencing individual migration decisions – the micro-scale “costs and benefits” of migration (Sjaastad, 1962). Though still focusing on economic variables, this
framework includes age, sex, education, and even the presence of relatives as factors influencing migration. This latter focus, incorporating family and household structures, and retreating from neo-classical dominance of wage and employment variables, has been called “the new economics of migration” (Massey et al., 1998: 125), or the “household strategies perspective” (Wood, 1982). This perspective characterizes the domestic unit as a group that ensures its maintenance and reproduction by generating and disposing of a collective income, resource and labor fund. The unit reacts to internal and external changes, such as changes in land availability or labor supply, through a series of dynamic “survival strategies”. Migration, of the whole unit or of some of its members, is one option which may be adopted as a strategy by which the household “actively strives to achieve a fit between its consumption necessities, the labor power at its disposal, and alternatives for generating monetary and non-monetary income” (Wood, 1982: 312). An extension of this approach recognizes that a household may not act as a cohesive unit and may in fact contain diverse and often conflicting interests and values amongst its members, frequently split along generational or gender lines defined by traditional normative roles such as “the breadwinner”, the “dutiful son”, the “home-based mother” etc. The relevance of this particular interpretative approach to the Egyptian case will become clear later in the thesis, as will the variable relevance of the more obviously economically-based principles mentioned above. I will also comment later on regarding the common economic assumption that (economically motivated) migrants are “favorably selected” with respect to human capital qualities like ambition, ability etc. (see Chiswick, 2000). Although there is much more that could be said here with regard to economic approaches to the study of rural–urban migration, it is best that this discussion is postponed for just a few pages until I address some of the key general theories of migration which are founded on economic principles.

c) Geography

The field of human geography includes a long-standing concern with the physical movement of people dating back at least to the 1880s and the statistical geographer Ravenstein whose so-called “laws of migration” are one of the foundation-stones of migration theory (see next sub-section). The traditional focus of geographers has been not so much on who migrates or why, or on the consequences of migration, but on identifying spatial patterns and directions of movement (Lewis, 1982). Geographers have
tended to model migration based on economic determinants – the relative economic attractiveness of places as defined by wages, job opportunities, dynamic growth etc. – but more recently social and cultural geographers have developed a strong interest in migration, alongside existing research operating from more economically-rooted population geographers (Boyle et al., 1998). The distance factor is inherent in geographic research and figures prominently in the well-known “gravity” model, in which migration between places is directly proportional to their mass (e.g. city size) and inversely proportional to the distance between them, and in the notion of “step migration” by which migrants move along a settlement hierarchy in stages. These gravity and hierarchical models are thought to be especially applicable to low-income and less educated migrants. In this context the importance of the accessibility and availability of transportation and communications networks to facilitate and encourage movement is readily seen. The close linkages between the geographic and economic approaches to migration are also seen in the focus of geographic research on the role of differences in economic opportunities and government investment on population redistribution across areas or regions.

Whilst the relevance of these geographical frameworks based on distance, settlement structure and spatial economic disparity to the Egyptian case is immediately apparent, it is also true that geographers (and not just geographers) appear to have lessened their interest in migration in Africa and the other less-developed continents. It is rather remarkable how, for instance, geographers’ work on rural–urban and circular migration in Africa seems to terminate with Prothero and Chapman’s volume in 1985. Possible reasons for this might be practical difficulties of fieldwork access to many countries, and a declining interest in rural–urban migration within the context of greater attention paid to other types of migration (international migration, refugee movements, mass internal displacement due to famine or war etc.) and to other paradigms for migration study (e.g. world systems theory, globalization etc.).

d) Anthropology
In recent decades anthropologists have engaged very actively with the study of migration. In fact the roots of an anthropological interest in migration go back further, for instance to the well-known Chicago School of Sociology and Anthropology in the
1920s and 1930s, when some remarkable studies were done on European and other migrants in American cities and on “source areas” such as Sicily and Mexico. More recently, since the 1960s, anthropologists have rediscovered migration through their studies of “peripheral societies”, for instance in rural southern Europe, the west of Ireland, or Pacific islands. Much of their attention has been focused on questions of culture, community and identity thrown up by international migration, and anthropologists have played a leading role in the current academic discourse on “transnational communities” (Brettell, 2000). They have, however, paid much less attention to internal migration, although their interest in the shape and behavior of migrant social networks, based on kin or community ties, has relevance to my own study.

3.3.2 Theories of migration with potential relevance to Egypt

In this sub-section I describe some specific theories of the determinants of migration, focusing on those that explain rural-to-urban migration, especially this form of migration in developing and semi-developed countries. As I go through each section and each theory/model, I will make backward connections to the review of the existing literature on Egyptian migration which I presented earlier in this chapter (see 3.2), and forward connections to the research strategies and questions which I examine in my own research in this thesis.

a) Ravenstein’s laws of migration

Theoretical explanations of rural-to-urban migration have a long history, dating from at least the 1880s when Ravenstein first proposed his “laws of migration”. Ravenstein’s laws (1885, 1888) were formulated partly in the context of international migration, including transatlantic mobility, but also covered other generic types of migration. According to these laws, migrants move from areas of low opportunity to areas of high opportunity. The choice of destination is regulated by distance, with migrants tending to move to nearby places, often in a staged process leading eventually to longer-distance moves to bigger cities: in other words, step-migration. Ravenstein further observed that each stream of rural–urban migration produces a counter-stream of return migration back to the rural areas. He hypothesized that urban residents are less migratory than rural people, and that migration accelerates with the
expansion of trade and industry. Ravenstein’s basic laws have since been systematized and expanded by many investigators and the importance of the economic motive in the decision to migrate, the negative influence of distance, and the process of step-migration have been generally supported by empirical evidence, at least in some countries.

As far as Egypt is concerned, there are very clear echoes of Ravenstein’s principles in the recent and current migration picture. Although the evidence for the “distance control” and for step-migration is patchy if not non-existent, we know from established literature reviewed earlier, and from common knowledge of the Egyptian situation, that migrants move from areas of low opportunity (e.g. Upper Egypt) to places of better opportunity (e.g. Cairo); and we know that reverse or counter-stream migration occurs, for instance when rural–urban laborers become older and go back to their villages to farm or retire. Further evidence on step-migration (or the lack of it), economic opportunity structures, and ties to villages of origin will be presented from my own empirical work later in the thesis.

b) Lee’s theory of migration

Building on Ravenstein’s laws, Lee developed a “general schema into which a variety of spatial movements can be placed” (Lee, 1966). He divided the forces exerting an influence on migrant perceptions into “push” and “pull” factors. The former are “negative” factors tending to force migrants to leave origin areas, while the latter are “positive” factors attracting migrants to destination areas in the expectation of improving their conditions. Lee hypothesized that factors associated with origin area conditions would be more important than those associated with destination areas. These factors associated with the areas of origin and destination are governed by personal factors “which affect individual thresholds and facilitate or retard migration” (Lee, 1966: 51). The final element in Lee’s model is the notion of “intervening obstacles” interposed between origin and destination. These constitute “friction” in the migration process (transport costs, migration controls etc.) and may reduce or retard migration, or even (in the case of a law) prevent it altogether. Lee’s approach is reflected in a broad range of studies, particularly sociological studies dealing with migrant selectivity. It is actually not a theory but rather a conceptual framework for classifying factors in migration decisions.
It is worth spelling out some of the key propositions or hypotheses arising from Lee’s refinement and further development of Ravenstein’s “laws”. I have rephrased these slightly (but not changed the basic meaning) to make them more consistent with the Egyptian case.

- The volume of migration within a given territory (such as a country) varies directly with the degree of geographical diversity (regional economic contrast).
- The volume of migration is inversely related to the difficulty of overcoming intervening obstacles.
- Both the volume and rate of migration increase over time.
- Migration tends to take place largely within well-defined streams (Lee elaborates this as from rural regions to regional towns and then towards major cities, in other words step-movement).
- For every major stream, a counterstream develops.
- The magnitude of net migration (stream minus counterstream) will be directly related to the weight of “minus” or “push” factors at origin.
- Migration is selective, i.e. migrants are not a random sample of the population of the place or region of origin.
- Migrants responding primarily to the “pull” factors at the destination will tend to be positively selected (more educated, more ambitious etc.), whereas those who respond predominantly to “push” factors from the origin will be negatively selected (less educated, poorer etc.).

Again, it does not need a great imaginative leap to realize that “push and pull” factors are fully relevant to the Egyptian case, where the historical record, both from statistics and literature, shows that migration is stimulated, at least at the macro level, by push factors of rural poverty, unemployment and lack of opportunity, and pull factors of urban employment, higher wages and at least the chance of better social and cultural facilities. Moreover the Egyptian case shows that migration does in fact take place in well-defined streams, but not, by and large, via step-migration. The more personal and behavioral interpretations of these potential push and pull factors will be investigated later by my field research, as will issues of migrant selectivity and counterstream/return.
c) The dual economy model of development and migration

The first well-known economic model of development to include as an integral element the process of rural–urban labor transfer was that of Lewis (1954), later extended by Fei and Ranis (1961) with the result that it is often referred to as the Lewis-Fei-Ranis or LFR model (Todaro, 1976). One version of this model considers migration as an equilibrating mechanism which, through transfer of labor from the labor-surplus to the labor-deficit sector, eventually brings about wage equality in the two sectors. The LFR model is based on the concept of a dual economy, comprising a subsistence, agricultural sector characterized by underemployment, and a modern industrial sector characterized by full employment.

In the subsistence sector the marginal productivity of labor is zero or very low and workers are paid wages to their cost of subsistence, so wage rates in this sector barely exceed marginal products. Because of high productivity or labor union pressures, wages in the modern urban sector are much higher. With such differences in wage rates, migration occurs from the subsistence to the industrial sector. This increases industrial production as well as the capitalists’ profit. Since this profit is assumed to be reinvested in the industrial sector, it further increases the demand for labor from the subsistence sector. The process continues as long as surplus labor exists in the rural areas and as long as this surplus is reflected in significantly different wage levels (Lewis maintained that the urban wage needed to be at least 30 percent higher than the rural one for rural–urban migration to take place). It might continue indefinitely if the rate of population growth in the rural sector is greater than or equal to the rate of growth of demand for labor out-migration, but it must end eventually if the rate of growth of demand for labor in the urban area exceeds rural population growth. In a variant of the LFR model applied to Southern Europe, King et al. (1997) demonstrate how this “exhaustion” of the supply of internal rural labor migrants was the trigger for stimulating a fresh supply of labor migrants from abroad, specifically from much poorer countries where wages are much lower, and labor surpluses abundant.

Despite the appeal of the dual economy model, particularly in countries with markedly uneven sectoral and spatial development, most observers have found it unsatisfactory because of a number of shortcomings (see for instance Dasgupta, 1981; Meilink, 1978;
Todaro, 1976). First, migration is not induced solely by low wages and underemployment in rural areas, although these are undoubtedly important influences. Second, the assumption of near-zero marginal productivity and surplus labor in agriculture has been widely criticized on empirical grounds (Dasgupta, 1981). Third, the LFR model assumes a high rate of expansion of employment opportunities through continuous investment of the rural capital surplus (via migration) in the urban sector. In fact, the rate of growth of employment in the modern industrial sector has generally not been sufficient in developing countries to absorb the increasing labor supply resulting from both natural population increase in the urban sector and net rural–urban migration driven by rural population growth. As a consequence, the net effect of rural–urban migration has instead often tended to have been to shift underemployment from the rural to urban sector. Fourth, there is the possibility that urban capitalists might invest their industrial profits in new technology and labor-saving machinery, thereby killing the demand for further rural labor transfers. Finally, the assumption of a modern industrial sector in a Third World city may be somewhat false: rural–urban migrants might not be entering the industrial sector but picking up low-productivity and still quite low-paid jobs in the informal economy of the city – for instance as street-hawkers, casual laborers or construction workers. Dasgupta (1981) is quite clear that “urbanization today … is less correlated with the progress of the industrialized sector than with … the ‘informal’ sector, where entry is easy but remuneration is low and unstable, and unemployment … is widespread”. Hence it seems that, whilst the LFR model has the virtue of being simple and intuitively attractive, and whilst it does seem to be in rough conformity with the historical experience of economic/industrial growth in the West, it has some characteristics, noted above, which are at variance with the realities of development processes and rural–urban migration in many Third World countries (Todaro, 1976: 23).

However, from what has been said already in this chapter and in the previous two chapters, it is not difficult to appreciate the at least partial relevance of the dual sector model in the Egyptian case. Egypt has a highly uneven spatial development, most clearly articulated around urban/rural, Lower/Upper Egypt dualities. Yet it is not really true to say that rural–urban migration takes place between the labor-surplus agricultural sector and the labor-deficit modern urban sector. Cairo and other large cities also suffer from unemployment, and we have to seriously question whether the laborers from Upper Egypt are really entering the
“modern” high-wage sector when they migrate to Cairo. Further empirical findings on this key question will follow later in this study.

\textit{d) Sjaastad’s human investment theory}

Sjaastad (1962) advanced a theory of migration which treats the decision to migrate as an investment decision involving an individual’s expected costs and returns over time. Returns comprise both monetary and non-monetary components, the latter including changes in “psychological benefits” as a result of location preferences. Similarly, costs include both monetary and non-monetary costs. Monetary costs include costs of transportation, disposal of property, wages foregone while in transit, and any training for a new job. Psychological costs include leaving familiar surroundings, adopting new dietary habits and social customs, and so on. Since these are difficult to measure, empirical tests in general have been limited to the income and other quantifiable variables. Sjaastad’s approach assumes that people desire to maximize their net real incomes over their productive life and can at least compute their net real income streams in the present place of residence as well as in all possible destinations; again the realism of these assumptions can be questioned since “perfect information” is not always the case, by any means.

As for the realism of the “migration as human investment” hypothesis to the Egyptian case, just a few preliminary remarks can be made at this stage. From what has been said already, the character of the Egyptian population shift from Upper to Lower Egypt is perhaps more of a “survival” strategy than an “investment” strategy. It seems that migrants go because there is no future for them in an agrarian system that is overburdened by labor, rapid population increase and extreme land fragmentation, and where the “fixed resource” of land is defined by topography, hydrography and climate. Questionnaire and interview data will further elaborate this issue of “survival versus investment”, and will shed further light on questions of earnings in Cairo as a return to the “investment decision” to migrate, and of psychological and other non-monetary costs and benefits. For instance, it will be interesting to see to what extent the psychological costs of dislocation etc. are cushioned by social networks and other forms of social solidarity amongst the rural laborers in Cairo.
e) Todaro’s model of rural–urban migration

Undoubtedly one of the most influential frameworks for understanding the driving forces behind rural–urban migration in developing countries is the model developed by Michael Todaro. Todaro’s model has been proposed, and refined, in a series of papers (see Todaro, 1969 and 1977; Harris and Todaro, 1970) and a monograph (Todaro, 1976). Todaro’s initiative was stimulated by his observation that “throughout the developing world, rates of rural–urban migration continue to exceed the rates of job creation and to surpass greatly the capacity of both industry and urban social services to absorb this labor effectively”. Todaro realized, along with many others, that rural–urban labor migration was no longer a beneficent or virtuous process solving simple inequalities in the spatial allocation of labor supply and demand. “On the contrary, migration today is being increasingly looked on as the major contributing factor to the ubiquitous phenomenon of urban surplus labor and as a force which continues to exacerbate already serious urban unemployment problems caused by growing economic and structural imbalances between urban and rural areas” (Todaro, 1976: 2, emphasis in original text).

Todaro suggested that the decision to migrate includes a perception by the potential migrant of an “expected” stream of income which depends both on prevailing urban wages and on a subjective estimate of the probability of obtaining employment in the modern urban sector, which is assumed to be based on the urban unemployment rate (Todaro, 1969; 1997). From this very preliminary description, we can see that Todaro’s model is both an extension of the human capital approach of Sjaastad and an attempt to accommodate the more unrealistic assumptions of the LFR model as regard Third World cities.

According to the Todaro approach, migration rates in excess of the growth of urban job opportunities are not only possible, but rational and probable in the face of continued and expected large positive urban–rural income differentials. High levels of rural–urban migration can continue even when urban unemployment rates are high and are known to potential migrants. Indeed Todaro (1976: 31) outlines a situation in which a migrant will move even if that migrant ends up by being unemployed or receives a lower urban wage than the rural wage: this action is carried out because low wages or unemployment in the
short term are expected to be more than compensated by higher income in the longer term as a result of broadening urban contacts and eventual access to higher-paid jobs. The approach therefore offers a possible explanation of a common paradox observed in Third World cities – continuing mass migration from rural areas despite persisting high unemployment in these cities.

Todaro’s basic model and its extensions consider the urban labor force in developing countries as distributed between the relatively small modern sector and a much larger traditional sector (Harris and Todaro, 1970). Wage rates in the traditional sector are considered not to be subject to the partially non-market institutional forces that maintain high wages in the modern sector but to be determined competitively. As a result, they are substantially lower than those in the modern sector, but still significantly higher than in the traditional rural subsistence sector. Most urban in-migrants are assumed to be absorbed by the traditional sector while they seek better employment opportunities in the modern sector.

Apart from the methodological and conceptual problems of estimating expected incomes and their differentials for particular origin and destination areas, a major weakness of Todaro’s model is its assumption that potential migrants are homogenous in respect of skills and attitudes and have sufficient information to work out the probability of finding a job in the urban modern sector. Despite the refinement of “expected” incomes, the model remains one based on the notion of “rational” and “well-informed” decision-making. It also rests on an underlying assumption that the migrants aspire to become permanent residents in the city, and ignores other forms of migration or mobility, including to-and-fro movement. Moreover, both the Todaro and the human investment models do not consider non-economic factors and abstract themselves from the structural aspects of the economy. A better understanding of the causes of migration requires an analysis of the macro-economic and institutional factors that generate rural–urban differentials. A distinction is needed between socio-economic structural factors and the specific mechanisms (unemployment, wage differences, etc.) through which the structural factors operate. These questions are addressed more directly towards the end of this chapter, in section 3.5.
Others have made more trenchant criticisms of the Todaro model, and Skeldon (1990) summarizes some of these negative views. According to the outspoken Oded Stark (1978), Todaro’s work “left the field beset with loss of direction (and) grave confusion”, whilst Standing (1984) denigrated the triteness of Todaro’s logic – “people move because they think it better for them to move, and we know that they thought it was so because they moved”. Meanwhile, Chapman and Prothero (1985: 19) point out that the Todaro model, despite its original empirical concern with unemployment in Kenya, is strangely silent about the vast circulation of labor which occurs across rural Tropical Africa – although it is also true to say that circulatory migration between peripheral rural communities and centers of employment in towns and mining areas has given way to more permanent rural–urban migration in Africa (van Binsbergen and Meilink, 1978: 11). The relevance of this penetrating remark by Chapman and Prothero for Egyptian case will emerge in the pages that follow. Undoubtedly the Todaro model is somewhat removed from the dynamic reality of migration behavior as observed in most parts of the developing world. It seems to imply that the rural worker considers migrating only once, and once the decision is made, it assumes this to be irrevocable (Gallup 1997: 3). As we shall see in the Egyptian case, reality is rather different, perhaps somewhere between the continuous circulation of the classical studies of Tropical African mobility and the urbanization processes fed by family-based rural–urban relocation. Migration decision behavior may change because of a whole range of non-economic variables. As Skeldon (1990: 129) concludes, “migration simply does not work the way Todaro says it does”.

Nevertheless, and despite these strong criticisms, I do feel that the Todaro model has something to contribute to a portrayal of the Egyptian case, if only sometimes to act as a mirror to reflect what does not happen. The preliminary information I have already discussed in the Egyptian literature review suggests that migrants to Cairo do indeed enter the traditional, not modern, sector of the city’s labor market, and that their incomes, whilst significantly higher than those that might derive from agriculture and other uncertain rural activities, are not those of the modern urban wage sector. My research on working conditions, social networks and types of information will later confirm and elucidate the extent to which migrants' perceptions of the urban employment environment and “expected” income streams are realistic assessments of the outcomes which actually take place. I will also explore the extent of occupational mobility, first
between the village and Cairo, and then within Cairo, to test or refute the Todaro hypothesis of a possible subsequent transfer of migrant work from the traditional urban to the modern urban sector (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Krieg, 1997).

f) The “new economics of migration”: families, households and segmented labor markets

As foreshadowed in my earlier account of economic approaches to migration (see section 3.3.1), the neoclassical view of migration has been challenged by a “new economics of migration” which posits that migration is less determined by isolated individuals than by other social units, especially families and households, but also potentially larger social aggregates such as communities, lineages etc. where social norms regarding migration behavior may be deeply embedded. This approach has been pioneered by Oded Stark in a large quantity of writings: see for instance Stark (1978) for an early but empirically detailed formulation, and Stark (1991) for a later and more theoretically elaborated synthesis. According to Stark, and others who have summarized his arguments (e.g. Massey et al., 1998: 21–28; Skeldon, 1997: 22–23), migration must often be seen as a family or group decision which seeks to minimize risks and diversify resources rather than to maximize cash income alone. This strategy, akin to a “portfolio investment” of the labor of the various members of the family in various “niches” in the origin region and elsewhere (abroad, or a town or city in the home country), involves widening the focus of the investigation away from the single, individual migrant. The emphasis is on channeling investment and consumption goods back to the home village rather than (as in the neoclassical model) on the economic progress of the migrant in the destination.

Although such “new economics” approaches have generally been applied to the international migration context (reflecting the dominant concern in migration studies with this form of movement in recent years), the principles apply almost equally well to internal migration fields, especially within large developing countries which are sharply differentiated internally (as Egypt). In fact, Massey et al. (1998: 21–22) explicitly recognize this when they state that “households … can easily diversify income by allocating various family workers to different geographically discrete labor markets: some may undertake productive activities in the local economy; others may work
elsewhere in the same country (for example, in a distant urban area); and still others may work in a foreign country”.

Reverting briefly to the Egyptian case, we can see the relevance of the strategy of combining income maximization with risk aversion, especially within the context of a crop-based rural economy. The sending of a family member (who may well be the male household head) to Cairo acts not only as a way of generating vital income but also as an integrating mechanism by which other household resources (crops, local work, etc.) are balanced and insured against failure or loss. Naturally, further details on this will follow later in the thesis.

The contextualization of an individual’s migration within a multi-member, multi-role household has some parallel to the way in which, at a larger scale, labor markets are increasingly theorized as being segmented. By this is meant the fragmentation of the labor market into two or more segments with essentially different entry requirements, conditions of work, wage levels etc. Whilst at one level this can be seen as a simple extension of Lewisian dual sector theory described above, the more recent elaboration of segmentation leads to new theoretical positions deriving from pioneering analyses made of international migration into advanced industrial societies, initially by Piore (1979), and later by theorists such as Portes and Mingione working respectively in North America and Europe (see for example Mingione, 1992; Portes, 1990; Portes and Bach, 1985). In this line of analysis, urban labor market segments or niches are essentially closed off, non-competing, and draw on different sources of labor supply differentiated by class, educational background, gender and above all ethnicity and geographical origin. Migrant workers will always be needed for those lowest-status jobs which are rejected by local workers; and within a large, highly differentiated developing country, or within a globalized international migration market, supplies of willing migrants will always exist, from Upper Egypt or wherever.

g) Rural–urban migration as a system, and the role of social networks

The next theoretical rationale conceives of migration as a system linking rural and urban areas. For the case of Egypt, the model of Mabogunje (1970), developed to explain
rural–urban migration in West Africa, would appear to have some relevance. The model is best set out as a diagram (Figure 3.1) and consists of a flow chart along which the migrant moves. In contrast to the more simplistic conceptualization of rural–urban migration as a uni-directional, push-pull, cause-and-effect movement, the Mabogunje model sees migration as circular, interdependent and progressively complex; a self-modifying system in which there are several interrelated linkages (Mabogunje, 1970: 16).

The model consists of four system components: the environment; the migrant; control subsystems; and adjustment and feedback mechanisms. Feedback can be either positive, encouraging the system to produce further migration, or negative, causing migration to decline. The rural control subsystem and adjustment mechanisms involve family/household relationships and reallocation of tasks (work, family responsibilities etc.) when the migrant departs; they also comprise landholding factors which may “expel” migrants due to landlessness or land fragmentation. Urban subsystems and control mechanisms include social networks, neighborhoods, means of accessing work and living space, the nature of work opportunities (informal labor markets, methods of recruitment etc.). Perhaps partly because of its African origin (albeit a very different part of Africa), Mabogunje’s model is on the face of things attractive for my Egyptian case study. The surprise, perhaps, is that the model has not been applied more widely in the more than 30 years since it was published. Probably this is because of the lack of detailed migration data in most developing countries, and the difficulty of collecting enough types of data to operationalize all of the model. Nevertheless the model is capable of being simplified and/or used in partial versions, as we shall see later.

Although Mabogunje saw his model as deriving from general systems theory, subsequent work in migration studies has emphasized the relevance of social networks and social capital in helping to explain how some of the details of the model might work. There is now a very extensive literature on social networks, social capital and allied, overlapping concepts such as chain migration, migration channels etc., but there is no space to explore this literature.
Figure 3.1

The systems approach to rural–urban migration by Mabogunje

here, not least because their potential relevance to my thesis presupposes a much more anthropological investigation than the one I have carried out. However, I shall make occasional use of these concepts from time to time, and will make further reference to literature when the time comes.

h) Survival migration

The economic explanations of human mobility treat the decision to migrate as an investment decision involving an individual’s expected costs and returns – monetary and non-monetary – over time (Sjaastad, 1962). This approach assumes that migrants have access to precise information about the economic conditions at both ends of the migration process, which is not always the case. An alternative model (Todaro, 1976) suggests that the decision to migrate is built on a perception of an “expected” stream of income which depends on urban wages and the probability of obtaining employment. However, Todaro assumes also that most urban in-migrants are able to upgrade and move from the informal or traditional sector to the modern sector. Despite its popularity and its applicability to some types of movements – mainly the more permanent rural–urban migration – the model fails to explain or even to acknowledge the circulatory migration of laborers within rural areas and between rural and urban areas (Chapman and Prothero, 1985). I pick up this argument in section 3.4.

The expansion of temporary mobility – including circulation – in developing countries cannot be explained in terms of conventional neoclassical economic theory, but it is readily understood from the household or family perspective (Hugo, 1998). Labor circulation permits the family to maintain control over the migrant and the income that he or she generates. Hugo sees rural-urban circulation as a survival strategy through which families in rural areas allocate family labor units to off-farm and on-farm tasks (in the village or in urban areas) in a way that both maximizes the production and income of the family and, at the same time, and more crucially, minimizes the risk of failure or disaster (Hugo, 1982, 1998). Minimizing the risk is vital to rural families in order for them to survive and to alleviate poverty. So, families plan or try to adopt survival strategies that involve the allocation of family labor to a range of tasks carried out at a variety of locations, rural, urban and perhaps also international.
As is clear from Hugo’s work, this approach can be regarded as a continuation or empirical elaboration of Oded Stark’s “new economics of migration” (Stark, 1991); both authors see that the migration decision is a family/household decision rather than an individual one. Hugo also notes that the cost of allocating one or two family members to work outside the village is likely to be less expensive than relocation of the whole family to a city. Parnwell (1993) also notes that population mobility in the Third World is more often a “survival strategy” than it is a mechanism for economic improvement.

This approach in explaining migration decision-making factors seems to be rather closely relevant to the Egyptian case, especially regarding the explanation of the specific segment of population under study. Indeed, the concept of survival migration and the notion of family decision-making in migration seem to have more relevance than the more individual, mechanistic Sjaastad and Todaro models. The relevance of survival migration to my study may become more evident after explaining different types of movements through time – migration, circulation, and mobility – in the next section.

### 3.4 Migration, circulation, and mobility

Population movements fall into a wide range of categories depending on the amount of time the movers spend away from their home communities, and the frequency and durations of their returns. These different types of movement may involve very different kinds of people in very different personal circumstances, or alternatively may involve people at different stages of their life span. The temporal dimension of population movement is very important in the sense that it tells us a great deal about the circumstances which may underpin the decision to migrate (Parnwell, 1993). In this subsection I shed further light on the different types of population movement with a special focus on circular migration in developing countries. The links to Egypt will become clear both immediately, and later throughout various sections of the thesis.

#### 3.4.1 Typology of human mobility
The measurement of population movement is the most difficult and problematic aspect among the three aspects of population change, the others being fertility and mortality (Skeldon, 1990). Bearing in mind the measurement difficulties, population movements can be differentiated by their temporal and spatial dimensions. Temporal dimensions include “circulation” and “migration”, although the difference between the two is often blurred in practice. Circulation encompasses a variety of movements, usually short-term and cyclical and involving no long-standing change of residence. Migration involves a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence. Circulation can be subdivided into daily, periodic, seasonal, and long-term (Gould and Prothero, 1975). Daily circulation involves leaving a place of residence for up to 24 hours. Periodic circulation may vary from one night to a year, although it is usually shorter than seasonal circulation. Seasonal circulation is a type of periodic circulation in which the period is defined by marked seasonality in the physical or economic environment. This type of circulation involves persons or groups who are absent from their permanent homes during a season or seasons of the year. Long-term circulation, defined by Gould and Prothero as absence from home for longer than a year, affects groups such as wage laborers and traders, who maintain close social and economic ties with their home area and intend to return.

Migration is therefore just one form of the broader phenomenon of human mobility, while others include for instance short and long-distance commuting, shuttle migration, and circulation. Figure 3.2 summarizes the temporal and spatial dimensions of human mobility. The spatial dimension of population movements is divided into two categories, internal and international. Internal movements occur within the borders of a specific country while international movement means crossing the borders of one country to another country. Four types of mobility can be identified in the internal movements of population: urban-to-urban (intra-urban), urban-to-rural, rural-to-urban, and rural-to-rural (intra-rural). These were the types of population transfer which were used to elaborate and document internal migration in Egypt from the available statistics (see section 3.1 in this chapter). With respect to the time-span of population movement, it varies widely from a very short period of absence to a very long period of many years which may – or may not – end with permanent residence in a new destination.
3.4.2 Circular migration in developing countries

Circular migration can normally only be detected in specialized surveys. It can not be captured by census data since circulation does not imply a change in the usual residence. Labor circulation, an even more specific type, is the process in which people periodically leave their permanent places of residence in search of wage employment at places too far away to enable them to commute daily (Mitchell, 1985). Labor circulation means that laborers do not change their usual or legal place of residence in the village but are absent at an urban – or other rural – destination for periods longer than a single day. Such movement can actually be associated with permanent full-time employment at the destination, but usually involves non-permanent work in the informal sector of the urban economy (Hugo, 1982). The importance of this non-permanent form of mobility has been shown in a number of general studies (Abu-Lughod, 1975; Bedford, 1973; Chapman and Prothero, 1985; Parnwell 1993; Prothero and Chapman 1985; Standing, 1985). Country case studies by Hugo (1975, 1982, 1985, 1998) and Spaan (1999) on Indonesia, Skeldon (1985, 1990) in Peru, and Roberts (1985) in Mexico have demonstrated the scale and importance of non-permanent forms of mobility in developing countries.

The theories of migration discussed in a previous part of this chapter (section 3.3) explored these theories in general terms as they apply to migration – with the latter implicitly defined as permanent and semi-permanent relocation. However, some of the
concepts reviewed incorporate a powerful explanation of labor circulation. The “new economics of labor migration” (Stark, 1991) and “survival migration” (Hugo, 1998) explain the relation between circular migration and socio-economic changes, cultural retention, poverty alleviation, income maximization, and risk aversion. In the next few paragraphs I explore some of these dimensions of circulation of relevance to my study.

a) Circulation and risk minimization
As I mentioned above, the “new economics of labor migration” argues that households diversify the allocation of household labor across different labor markets in order to minimize risk and maximize income (Massey et al., 1998). By carefully allocating available labor through circulation, families can achieve a difficult dual target – maximize income and avoid risk. Rural households in developing countries with a high prevalence of extended, rather than nuclear, families in the village can circulate or commute surplus labor elsewhere – to other neighboring villages or to urban areas – in order to supplement household income, while the remaining members of the family can do the limited village-based work in agriculture or in any other non-agricultural labor.

The findings of Hugo’s important research on circulation in Java, Indonesia (Hugo, 1982) reveal that risk aversion is the most important motive behind circulation. Many of Java’s rural residents circulate, and they do this as a “survival strategy”, and as a risk minimization mechanism, rather than aiming at income maximization as the overall “economic” objective.

b) Circulation and social networks
The development of social networks plays a vital role in the absorption of newcomers to the destination areas, which in turn facilitates the process of labor circulation, allowing migrants to retain their primary social allegiance to their home areas of origin. Social networks provide information, shelter, and ease the absorption of new arrivals by introducing them to the labor market and the available opportunities. Social networks are regarded as a form of social capital which may diminish the risks and costs of migration and mobility. It is important to recognize that such networks are not just located in the place of destination to which a migrant moves, or confined to the place of migrant origin, but can stretch between the two, and thus provide the spatially elongated
links that enable to-and-fro circulation to take place, and be maintained through often extended periods of time – such as a lifetime. Networks, then, are sets of interpersonal ties that connect movers, former movers, and non-movers in places of origin and destination through social ties. Their specific relevance for studies of circular migration has been emphasized more recently by Faist (1997: 193) when he says that human mobility has moved from being “a linear, unidimensional, push-and-pull, cause-effect movement” to “a circular and interdependent” phenomenon which is closely affected by, and in turn affects, a variety of social networks that are embedded in the mobility process.

c) Circulation and labor market
Circular migrants usually join the urban informal sector. The term "informal sector" is also known by many other names such as parallel economy, micro-economy, submerged economy, unorganized sector, and other terms. In very simple terms, the informal sector is how people cope with hard times and represents a hand-to-mouth existence for many people and their families in developing countries. The informal sector does not exist in isolation from the formal sector; on the contrary it is an essential part of so-called modern patterns of production and rooted into the economy of many countries both developed and developing. The competition to reduce labor costs and to find more "flexible" production methods has resulted in a restructuring of the formal sector by subcontracting part of its production and trade to the informal sector.

The modern workforce is divided into “core” and “periphery” sections, sometimes also referred to as “primary” and “secondary” labor markets (Piore, 1979). While the core is made up of well-trained and well-paid permanent workers, the peripheral workforce comprises casual and part-time workers who are hired during busy times and then laid off, without any obligation on behalf of the employer, when they are not needed. The informal sector is yet one step further away from the core, squeezed out of the formal labor force and placed on the outer periphery. This outer periphery may of course be spatially as well as functionally distant from the urban location of these kinds of employment, with rural workers circulating in and out of the urban informal sector. While their work may be linked to the activities of the formal sector, they are not formally engaged by any enterprises. Thus the informal sector provides jobs, income and livelihood for masses of workers who would otherwise have no alternatives. Through
their social networks and circulation pathways, laborers from rural areas can survive and find work in the urban informal sector.

d) Circulation and division of labor
When the families/households take the decision to send one or more of their members – most probably males in the Egyptian case – they are aware of the restructuring and re-allocation of workload in- and/or off-farm in the village. Long-term circulation has pushed many older members of the family and women to work to substitute the absence of young men who circulate elsewhere (Standing, 1985). This line of argument seems to be consistent with the Mabogunje’s (1970) rural control subsystem and rural “adjustment mechanisms” which involve family/household relationships and the re-allocation of workload and responsibilities when one or more of the family members departs. In this situation, women are often found to take more responsibility and have more control in the absence of their husbands. Findings from an Egyptian study (Brink, 1991) suggest that women's status within the family increases when their husbands migrate to look for work. Cases are cited of women becoming more active in farming, wage labor, dealing with government agencies, and generally taking over the husbands' roles as family decision-maker. Other research in Egypt (Nawar and Mostafa, 1990; Taylor, 1984) suggests similar findings, namely that women's status within the family increases when their husbands migrate/circulate to look for work. Later in this thesis, I will bring my own research findings to bear on these issues in the Egyptian context.

e) Circulation and remittances
The importance of remittances is attributed to a number of factors: first, the scale and pace of rural–urban migration/circulation; second, the magnitude and the consistency of urban-to-rural remittances; third, the widespread interest in transfers of incomes and in mechanisms that generate changes in income distribution; and fourth, the impact of remittances on the resource constraint in the economy at large where savings are suboptimal and, in particular, in the agricultural sector, especially with respect to technological change in agricultural production (Stark and Lucas, 1988). Remittances are an important form of migrants' support to their families at home. For the poorest migrants and circular movers, remittances can be a large proportion of their total
income.

The impact of remittances on recipient families in rural areas has been a subject of considerable debate, centering around the distribution of use between consumption and investment. For poorer sending families, remittances are part of a “survival strategy”. They can support immediate basic consumption needs such as improved diets. But this means that little or nothing is left over for productive or innovative investment: this is the case for most circular migrants, who can barely survive. The flow of remittances that is associated with international and national permanent and semi-permanent types of migration is generally more stable than that of circular laborers. As a consequence, the effect of and the allocation of remittances may vary among the various migrant groups. While remittances of long-term migrants are directed more to investment rather than consumption, the remittances of circular migrants are directed more towards fulfilling the basic needs of their families in the village and place of origin. We return once again to the survival strategy behind labor circulation (Hugo, 1998).

f) Circulation and modernization
Zelinsky (1971) has proposed a well-known model called the hypothesis of the “mobility transition”, in which various types of migration, including circulation, play a role. In this model, Zelinsky theorizes that mobility generally increases with modernization. The model as proposed by Zelinsky consists of five phases to describe the relation between mobility and the level of development of the society as follows. First, there is the pre-modern transitional society with limited circular movement. Second comes the early transition society with massive movement from countryside to cities, colonization movement, and circulation. This is succeeded by the late transition society with slackening, but still major, movement from rural to urban areas, a lessening flow of migrants to the frontiers of colonization, and continuing and even increasing circulation. Fourthly, there is the advanced society where rural-urban movements decrease, urban-urban movements increase and societies are increasingly urbanized. International migration and circulation increase in the forms of in-migration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers internally, and emigration of highly-skilled labor and professional persons internationally. Finally we have the future super advanced society in which Zelinesky hypothesized a decline in the level of residential migration and a deceleration in some
forms of circulation as better communications systems are instituted. Intra- and international circulation persists but international movements are restricted and controlled.

Of course Zelinsky’s model, like so many models of national socio-economic change, is largely predicated on the historical experience of the Western, developed countries. Furthermore, one can easily take issue, with the benefit of hindsight, over the final stage. It seems that “super advanced modernity” has been accompanied not by a deceleration of migration and mobility, but by an increase of a whole range of mobility types in the developed world – including new forms of circulation, long-distance commuting etc. which derive from new lifestyles, new geographies of economic and other opportunities, and new life-stage factors (youth travelers, retirement migrants etc.). Moreover these new mobility forms are facilitated (rather than repressed or replaced) by new modes of fast transport and communications (King, 2002). However, what interests us here are less the new forms of migration in Europe and elsewhere, and more the potential relevance of the Zelinsky model, including its repeated reference to circulation, to the developing world in general and to Egypt in particular.

Skeldon (1990) has assessed the wider validity of Zelinsky’s model on the basis of contemporary and historical examples. He shows that the model, with its five phases, is useful but needs to be modified to extend its applicability to the developing world, since the model is built on the experience of the developed world. The adjustments pertain particularly to the role of the cities and the relationship between development and the various types of mobility: that is, parallel with development there is a sequence of change in the importance of primate and intermediate urban centers, and in the changing sex composition of migration flows. Initially there is intra-urban migration directed at the primate city, after which during the phase of *intermediate transitional society* both the primate city and small urban centers grow rapidly with accelerating rural-urban movement from the direct hinterland. Finally, in the *late transitional society* the intermediate cities are “short-circuited” and the primate city becomes the main destination (Skeldon, 1990, p. 111). Furthermore, while the sequence progresses male-
dominated migration evolves toward a greater female participation and the sex composition of migrants is almost balanced.

The value of Zelinsky’s model and Skeldon’s modified version is that it pays attention to the links between phases in development and different forms of population movements and does not limit itself only to internal migration flows. Instead it shows that in the different phases of development different forms of mobility take place – e.g. rural–urban circulation and movement across international borders. Skeldon advocates to build an explanation of population mobility on two different levels, the spatial and temporal structure of mobility, in order to uncover the specific social networks of migration and their evolution and to place them within a macro political-economic context, the framework of which is provided by world systems analysis. He acknowledges the existence of mobility patterns before the onset of capitalism in the Third World but asserts that with capitalist development society is transformed and patterns of mobility are modified. Yet again, these issues will be picked up for further comment later in my thesis.

3.5 Rural–urban migration in developing countries

After this long theoretical excursus, let us now return more pragmatically to the rural environment of out-migration and examine some of the key factors and processes at work which are driving rural-to-urban mobility in countries such as Egypt. In many developing countries rural poverty manifested in low agricultural incomes, low productivity and underemployment is pushing many migrants out of rural areas towards areas with greater (perceived) employment opportunities. Several recent studies in a range of developing countries have observed increasing unemployment in rural areas and a further widening of the gap between rural and urban incomes (see, as examples, Bhattacharya, 1993; Cashin and Sahay, 1996; Gedik, 1985; Iyoha, 1975; Kim, 1982; Stern, 1984). The pressure of population in terms of higher people/land ratios has been hypothesized as an important cause of increasing poverty and of rural out–migration: with given technology, there is only a certain proportion of the labor force which can be absorbed by agriculture, and indeed as technology advances, demand for rural labor may
diminish, thereby creating further unemployment. As the population grows, increasing numbers of people must move to the urban centers for employment opportunities, unless difficult-to-imagine radical improvements can be made in agricultural intensity and rural systems. In fact, population pressure is not the only nor even the principal cause of the increasing unemployment and poverty of the rural population; at least as important are the low rate of investment in agriculture, fragmentation of land ownership, inequalities in the distribution of land and other productive assets, and a pattern of production where investment and technological change are biased against labor. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that much farm technology is imported from labor-scarce countries and favors the use of capital relative to labor (Lucas, 1997).

Due to the over-population problem in most developing countries, especially in Africa, and the continuing high levels of demographic fertility, the pool of landless and near-landless increases from generation to generation. Progressive fragmentation of land has pushed many of the landless and near-landless to move to cities in search of non-agricultural jobs.

While these factors have led to rural–urban migration among the very poor, the creation of schools in rural areas has also stimulated out-migration by providing children, especially those of the rural middle and upper classes, with education and an awareness of the economic and social opportunities available in urban centers; some migrate to further their education while others migrate as they become dissatisfied with the prospects of rural life. A number of studies (e.g. Alatas, 1993; Kim, 1982) clearly support the hypothesis that migrants are attracted to cities in search of better social services (better educational facilities for their children, better health services, and cultural and entertainment outlets). In addition, a number of factors such as having sources of contact in urban areas to provide information and initial assistance (friends and relatives) accelerate the process of rural–urban migration. The mass media constitute another source of information that motivates migrants (Iyoha, 1975).

The concentrated growth of industrial infrastructure in the cities in developing countries after independence has encouraged migration streams from rural regions by providing job opportunities for those migrants. Until recently, governments have also favored a policy of concentrating public and social services investments in urban areas, particularly
major urban areas. Similar investments in the rural areas have been neglected. In most of the developing world, migrants from rural to urban regions target primate cities. This phenomenon is due to the concentration of services, industrial zones, and other socio-economic and cultural services in primate cities and large metropolitan regions. Clear examples of this are Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt, Khartoum in the Sudan, and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia (on this last case see Palen, 1976): in all these cases, most of the migrants from rural areas migrate to these cities.

The development of transport systems has been found to reduce the role of distance on inhibiting migration in developing countries (Greenwood et al., 1981). Transportation and communication systems not only reduce the cost of migration but also lessen the psychological and cultural gap between the origin and destination areas, thus making migration easier. In the case of Egypt, the existence of transport systems along the Nile Valley has obviously facilitated the movement of Upper Egyptian laborers to Cairo, and their subsequent to-and-fro return visits to their villages, as we shall see in more detail later.

3.5.1 Country case studies: introduction

Here I present three short country case studies by referring to some other key literature on Syria, Morocco and Turkey. I choose these countries based partly on available literature and partly on the criterion of providing a selection of countries located within the same “world region” as Egypt. Syria, Morocco, and Turkey lie within the same broad Mediterranean/Middle Eastern region as Egypt: these four countries possess some similarities as regards their low to intermediate levels of development, their geographical and demographic structure, and their rapidly transforming and modernizing economies and societies. I acknowledge that this rather intuitively-selected “grab sample” is limited, and the case-studies are brief: nevertheless I suggest that the exercise has some illustrative value in the face of the impossibility of a complete review of rural–urban migration in all developing and semi-developed countries of the world.

3.5.2 Syria

In contrast to Egypt, in which the acceleration of the urbanization process began in the late 1930s and early 1940s, in Syria rapid urbanization started almost two decades later,
in the late 1950s. From the late 1950s and early 1960s onward, urbanization in Syria accelerated, and during the years 1960–70 the percentage of the urban population within the total Syrian population increased from 36.9 to 43.5 percent. During 1970s and 1980s the rate of urbanization slowed down, and the urban population increased by only 6.7 percent points during these two decades (from 43.5 percent in 1970 to 50.2 percent in 1990). Further incremental growth in the urban share of total Syrian population took place in the first half of the 1990s: by 1995 it was 51.5 percent. Interestingly, much of this urban growth has been due to the expansion of smaller towns rather than the major cities (Winckler, 1999: 69). So, in Syria, in contrast to other Middle Eastern and North African countries which were also witness to a large rural–urban migration, the major proportion of the migration movement has occurred within the borders of the provinces themselves, rather than from the rural regions to the capital. In Egypt, as in most developing countries, the vast majority of the rural–urban migration has been directed to the capital or to the second largest city (Alexandria). Thus, the pattern of rural–urban migration in Syria is a rather unusual case in the Middle Eastern countries. As a result of this unique pattern, the percentage of the Damascus (the capital) population within the total Syrian population has remained stable during the last four decades: 11.6 percent in 1960, increasing slightly to 12.3 percent in 1981, and then decreasing to 10.5 percent in 1995. Two reasons can be suggested for the particular pattern of urban–rural migration in Syria: first, the spatial distribution strategy of the Syrian authorities which followed a decentralization policy in the allocation of industrial and socio-economic projects; second, the geographical structure of the country where the parts most suitable for human settlement on a large scale are not concentrated in small areas like the case of Egypt (Winckler, 1999: 70).

Due to the housing problem in urban areas in Syria, a great proportion of migrants to urban areas tend to look for job in cities without moving definitively alone or with the family to stay permanently in town. They rather prefer to leave the family in the village and move back and forth between the village and the nearby town according to labor market opportunities: the classic phenomenon of circulation described above. The housing problem in the big towns, in addition to enhancements in transportation and the availability of modern services in rural areas, has encouraged rural laborers to commute to the adjacent urban areas looking for work (Zakaria, 1987).
Otherwise, the reasons of rural–urban migration in Syria are almost the same as in Egypt and most other developing countries. Push factors have constituted the dominant reasons, while pull factors function only as secondary reasons. Push factors include scarcity of cultivated land, low level and instability of income in the rural areas, concentration of the rural economy almost exclusively on agriculture, and the gap in health care and educational services between the urban centers and the rural areas. The pull factors are mainly the desire for acquisition of higher education, industrial development in urban centers, and the generally more attractive urban work and social facilities (Winckler, 1999: 74–81).

3.5.3 Morocco

The degree of urbanization of Morocco in the twentieth century is unexceptional by Third World and North African standards. Both Algeria and Tunisia, for example, have a somewhat higher rate of urbanization. One of the unique features of Morocco's urbanization, however, is the creation of an increasing number of towns. Mining of phosphate, coal, and iron provided the necessary economic base for new urban settlements. Tourism also contributes to the expansion of urban settlements: several tourist resorts have been created along the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and on the slopes of the Atlas mountains.

The second major source of Morocco's urban growth – after the high natural population increase – is rural migration which generally accounts for one third of the overall increase of urban population. For several decades, migration to the cities absorbed around two-thirds of the annual natural increase in rural areas. Rural poverty has always tended to be the main driving force behind rural–urban migration in Morocco. In the early 1960s, about 25 percent of the families in rural areas were landless, 50 percent had less than 3 hectares, and only 25 percent of rural families had more than 3 hectares. If rural poverty has been the main push factor, urban amenities such as education, health, and cultural services have been the main pull factors in the Moroccan case (Ibrahim, 1980).

More recent trends in rural–urban migration in Morocco can be investigated based on
the 1991 Survey on Internal Migration reported in the 1995 *African Population Newsletter*. Morocco has experienced a recent rise in urban population from 29.3 percent of the total population in the early 1960s to 48.4 percent three decades later. Rural–urban migration averages 3.6 percent annually and has played a key role over the past 30 years in population redistribution. Migration during the 1980s was attributed by the Survey to deepening economic hardship in villages. Prior to 1971, migration was to the largest cities, particularly those cities on the Casablanca–Kenitra Atlantic axis. During the 1980s, migration was more to medium-sized cities such as Marrakesh, Fez, and Sale. The reasons for migration are identified as reduced water supplies, lack of arable land or degraded land, increased population pressure, and the land tenure system that ranges from fragmented plots to concentrated farms. Rural areas suffered from a lack of health and educational services and poor opportunities for educated workers. In the survey of 1991, 33 percent of migrants reported the main reason for migration as the search for better jobs or better wages, 31 percent indicated migration was in order to join a family member or spouse, and 11 percent migrated for educational reasons. Some 87.7 percent of migrants were under 30 years old at time of departure; 39.5 percent were under 15 years, 25 percent were 15–19 years, and 23.2 percent were 20–29 years old. The 1991 survey revealed that men tended to migrate for economic reasons, whereas women migrated primarily for family reasons. Most men were unmarried at the time of migration, while most women were already married. Four-fifths of migrating women did not have a formal education. About half of the men and the same share of the women were classed as unskilled. Only 7 percent sent remittances to relatives in rural areas, although 70 percent visited at least once a year.

### 3.5.4 Turkey

Historically speaking, Turkey and its predecessor, the Ottoman State, have been subject to intensive population movements since their inception. One can claim that the history of Turkey and the Ottoman State is a history of migration. There has been a profound change in the spatial distribution of the population within Turkey and, since the 1960s, the establishment of a large diaspora population, mainly in Germany and the other northwest European countries (Atalik and Beeley, 1993). The move into the Turkish city in the twentieth century was prompted by social disintegration in the countryside, rural
economic hardship, established traditions of migration, and some knowledge of the urban environment on the part of the rural-origin migrants. The general direction of rural migration has been from the mountains and from poor and less developed regions in the east and north-east toward the more developed, industrializing, and fertile areas in the west. The Black Sea region was traditionally the largest migrant-sending area, while the Marmara and west-central Anatolian regions were the largest migrant-receiving areas (Karpat, 1976). The factors that have traditionally motivated rural residents to migrate to urban areas mostly cluster around the diminishing possibilities of a satisfying life in the rural regions. High population growth and the increasing entries into the working-age cohort lead to continuous underemployment and unemployment in rural areas.

The results of the 1997 Turkish census show that 65 percent of the Turkish population lives in cities and towns compared to 59 percent 1990, 53 percent in 1985 and 49 percent in 1980; the equivalent figure in 1927 had been only 24 percent. This means that since 1980 the urban population of Turkey increased at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent. The corresponding figure for the non-urban rest of the country was 1 percent. These calculations of the urban versus the non-urban population are based on the 73 provincial capitals and 829 district centers – so the definition of “urban” includes hundreds of quite small towns. The 1997 population census shows that the population of the three biggest cities in Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, plus Adana and Bursa make up 44.9 percent of the urban population in Turkey and 26.7 percent of the whole population. The largest city, Istanbul, with 10 million people and more than 400,000 new migrants from different parts of Turkey each year, has grown 20 percent within five years. As a result, one in every nine citizens in Turkey lives in Istanbul, and this megalopolis continues to face considerable migratory pressures. It is also the case that the share of medium-sized cities within the urban population is rapidly increasing while the rural population is now decreasing in absolute terms. In 1980, there were 26 cities with a population of between 100,000 and one million in Turkey. Their number increased to 32 in 1985 and to 40 in 1990. The number of smaller towns with a population of between 10,000 and 100,000 was 282 in 1980, growing to 407 by 1990.

How can we explain the rural–urban migration in Turkey? What are the pull and push factors for internal migrations? For the earlier postwar decades, Munro’s (1974)
As regards pull factors, industrialization and the growth of the service sector in the cities can be named as the key influences. The need for new labor could be supported by increasing long-distance transport opportunities and the resulting mobility of the rural population. However, the decisive structural factors framing internal migrations were regional development disparities, which manifested themselves partly in the imbalanced concentration of industries and other economic sectors between regions. Unlike countries that are regionally relatively equally developed, Turkey has enormous development differences between the regions. Migrations take place either to nearby cities (intraregional migration) or to western Turkey (interregional migration) where industry is quite well established and the chances of employment are better (Koray, 1999). Although the east-west divide in Turkey is a robust generalization about the nature of regional duality, there are other patterns, including areas of out-migration and rural population loss in western Thrace and along the Black Sea coast, and areas of population gain along the touristically important south coast (Atalik and Beeley, 1993). The same authors also identify some newer characteristics of Turkish migration and social trends which reflect a more “European” than “Third World” population status. Although large conurbations continue to grow, inner-city population loss and the growth of outer metropolitan districts indicate a form of counterurbanization in progress.
Secondly, “the principal result of the massive relocation of Turks within their country since the early 1960s has been the ending of the traditionally clear distinction between urban and rural society” (Atalik and Beeley, 1993: 159). Rural–urban migration, and the modernization of villages, have eroded the traditional contrasts between townspeople and villagers. On the one hand the practice of recent rural migrants to settle in *gecekondu* squatter settlements (literally meaning “built in the night”) on the edge of big cities implies a partial “ruralization” of these cities, since such migrants retain close links with home villages and do not get fully incorporated into the urban economy or society, subsisting on casual jobs in the informal sector. On the other, improved communications, electrification and more standardized educational curricula have to some extent brought urban values and standards of living to most rural areas.

Despite Turkey’s slightly more advanced economic status, it is clear that there are many similarities between the patterns of internal migration in Turkey and Egypt. Both are big countries with large populations and they dominate the north-eastern and south-eastern quadrants of the Mediterranean Basin, respectively. In both countries there is a pronounced spatial economic duality: east and west Turkey, Upper and Lower Egypt. And in both countries migrants migrate in vast numbers from rural areas to metropolitan cities (Cairo, Alexandria; Istanbul, Ankara) motivated by regional disparities in the level of development and the high unemployment rates in rural areas.

### 3.5.5 Summing up

It is clear from the case studies presented above that the rural–urban migration trends and patterns in other Mediterranean Basin developing countries are almost the same. Rural poverty pushes millions of the surplus laborers in agriculture to urban centers and large cities. Generally, migrants aim towards the largest cities: the experience of Egypt, where most migration is to Cairo and Alexandria, is matched by most other developing countries in various parts of the world. Syria is something of an exception, where migrants tend to migrate to urban centers in their provinces rather than the capital: in this country, the decentralization and the balanced allocation of resources by region is an important factor in directing rural–urban migration away from the capital. On the other hand, Syria’s experience of rural-based circulation of labor
migrants to urban areas has, perhaps, more in common with what seem to be the predominant patterns of rural–urban mobility in Egypt, and less in common with the forms of more permanent rural–urban migration (and emigration abroad) which are characteristic of Morocco and Turkey.

3.6 Conclusion: some pointers for a conceptual framework for studying internal migration in Egypt

Building on the research questions set out in Chapter 1, the literature review of existing studies in Egyptian migration, the review above on standard theories of migration and circulation, and the selected country-studies, I conclude this chapter by shaping a conceptual framework appropriate to my study. The skeleton of this framework is set out in diagrammatic form in Figure 3.3. This is basically a conceptual model of factors influencing the decision to migrate in Egypt, linking through channels of migrant networks and information to the decision to move to Cairo, where migration experience and adjustment mechanisms lead to feedback links to the area of origin and further migration decisions – either by the migrant “being modeled” (return migration, further migration elsewhere etc.), or by new migrants setting off for Cairo from the villages of origin. This model will be operationalized through the questionnaire which is my main data-gathering instrument and will be described in more detail in Chapter 4. As can be seen, the model integrates a number of perspectives which have been discussed in this chapter, and bears some resemblance to the Mabogunje model set out in Figure 3.1.

The factors influencing the decision to migrate can be seen to express themselves at various scales: individual, family/household, societal, and broadly structural/economic factors. They can be categorized in the following broad areas:

- Social factors based in the places of origin, including the desire of migrants to break away from the constraints of traditional social systems. At the same time, the existence of these traditional norms and values may well condition the form that migration behavior takes, shaped by social networks linking origin and destination and thereby favoring circular migration regimes.
Figure 3.3
Schematic Framework for Analyzing Rural-Urban Migration Decision Making and Effects in Egypt
• Socio-cultural attractions of life in urban areas, including the available infrastructure and public services in urban areas – these attractions might range from the “bright lights” of the city (coffee-shops, cinemas and other entertainment) to more pragmatic facilities of modern urban life such as piped water, electricity, sewage disposal systems etc.

• High levels of unemployment and (relative) poverty in rural areas due to the seasonal nature of job opportunities in the agricultural sector, and land fragmentation and pressure due to overpopulation problems. Other aspects of the agrarian structure and rural life – such as the price of agricultural products and inputs – will also function as potential push factors for migration. The variability of some of these elements at different times of the year – e.g. seasonal unemployment – may encourage circular forms of migration, integrating farm work with urban employment opportunities.

• Following on from the above, differences in wages between rural and urban areas will be crucial, as will be the ability of the urban economy (including the informal sector) to absorb unskilled labor migrants. Migrants’ knowledge about urban wage levels, and their expectations about being able to access these higher wages (both immediately and after a spell of time in the city), will also influence the migration decision.

• Household-level factors include family size, and therefore the “dependency burden”, and the migration experiences and potentials of other family members, including, perhaps, migration abroad.

• Finally, there is a set of more individual-scale personal factors, such as education, skill level, psychological characteristics such as openness, ambition, etc., which may condition whether an individual migrates and, if they do, the character of that migration experience. Such individual factors affect and motivate individuals in rural Egypt to seek information about alternatives away from their regular place of residence. Evaluation of alternatives depends mainly on individuals’ abilities to
estimate the expected benefits in the area of destination and compare them with losses in the village setting. On the other hand, circular migration enables the migrant to have, to some extent, “the best of both worlds” – urban work and wages, and rural social and household security.

After experiencing migration and being exposed to new patterns of social behavior and urban life, it is to be expected that these experiences will affect migrants’ behavior when they return to their villages. For this reason, some village-based fieldwork is built into the research design. Changes in behavior after migration may be towards modernization and “urban” behavior (including, crucially, demographic behavior with regard to fertility); or they may conceivably work in the opposite direction if the migration experience leads to migrants reinforcing, or at least conserving, their pre-existing norms, values and customs. This latter outcome might result from the strength of rural customs, values and social/kinship networks, and could conceivably reflect a negative reaction against an “alien” urban environment. Once again, there remains the possibility that the counterposing “opposition” of the rural and the urban environments can be rationalized by the migrants by a continual movement, and hence “presence”, between the two domains, via to-and-fro or circular mobility. Questionnaire and interview data will shed copious light on these issues.